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Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital
PÉTER KONDOR and DIMITRI VAYANOS∗
ABSTRACT
We develop a continuous-time model of liquidity provision, in which hedgers can trade multi-
ple risky assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have CRRA utility, while hedgers’ asset demand
is independent of wealth. An increase in hedgers’ risk aversion can make arbitrageurs endoge-
nously more risk-averse. Because arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, an increase in their
wealth or a reduction in their CRRA coefficient can raise risk premia despite Sharpe ratios de-
clining. Arbitrageur wealth is a priced risk factor because assets held by arbitrageurs offer high
expected returns but suffer the most when wealth drops. Aggregate illiquidity, which declines
in wealth, captures that factor.
Keywords: Liquidity risk, wealth effects, heterogeneous agents, intermediary asset pricing,
endogenous risk
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Liquidity in financial markets is often provided by specialized agents, such as market makers,
trading desks in investment banks, and hedge funds. Adverse shocks to the capital of these agents
cause liquidity to decline and risk premia to increase. Conversely, movements in the prices of assets
held by liquidity providers feed back into these agents’ capital.1
In this paper we study the dynamics of liquidity providers’ capital, the liquidity that these
agents provide to other participants, and assets’ risk premia. We build a framework with minimal
frictions, in particular no asymmetric information or borrowing constraints. The capital of liquidity
providers matters in our model only because of standard wealth effects. At the same time, we depart
from most frictionless asset-pricing models by fixing the riskless rate and by suppressing wealth
effects for agents other than the liquidity providers. These assumptions are sensible when focusing
on shocks to the capital of liquidity providers in an asset class rather than in the entire asset
universe.
Our combination of assumptions makes it possible to prove general analytical results on equilib-
rium prices and allocations. We characterize, in particular, how liquidity providers’ risk-appetite,
the endogenous risk that they generate, and the pricing of that risk, depend on liquidity deman-
ders’ characteristics and on liquidity providers’ capital. We also show that the capital of liquidity
providers is the single priced risk factor, and that liquidity aggregated over the assets that we
consider captures that factor because it increases in capital. Our results thus suggest that a priced
liquidity risk factor may arise even with minimal frictions.
We assume a continuous-time infinite-horizon economy. There is a riskless asset with an exoge-
1A growing empirical literature documents the relationship between the capital of liquidity providers, the liquidity
that these agents provide to other participants, and assets’ risk premia. For example, Comerton-Forde et al. (2010)
find that bid-ask spreads quoted by specialists in the New York Stock Exchange widen when specialists experience
losses. Aragon and Strahan (2012) find that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, hedge funds doing
business with Lehman experienced a higher probability of failure, and the liquidity of the stocks that they were
trading declined. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that stocks sold by mutual funds that experience extreme outflows
drop significantly in price during the outflow period and earn abnormally high expected returns over the next eighteen
months. Jylha and Suominen (2011) find that outflows from hedge funds that perform the carry trade predict poor
performance of that trade, with low interest-rate currencies appreciating and high interest-rate ones depreciating.
Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013) find that risk premia in commodity-futures markets are larger when
broker-dealer balance sheets are shrinking.
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nous and constant return, and multiple risky assets whose prices are determined endogenously in
equilibrium. There are two sets of competitive agents: hedgers, who receive a risky income flow
and seek to reduce their risk by participating in financial markets, and arbitrageurs, who take the
other side of the trades that hedgers initiate. Arbitrageurs can be interpreted, for example, as
speculators in futures markets. We consider two specifications for hedgers’ preferences. Hedgers
can be “long-lived” and maximize constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility over an infinite
consumption stream, or they can be “short-lived” and maximize a mean-variance objective over
changes in wealth in the next instant. Under both specifications, hedgers’ demand for insurance is
independent of their wealth. On the other hand, because arbitrageurs maximize constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility over consumption, the supply of insurance depends on their wealth.
Arbitrageur wealth impacts equilibrium prices and allocations, and is the key state variable in
our model. Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving a system of ordinary differential equations
(ODEs) in wealth, with boundary conditions at zero and infinity. These ODEs include non-linear
terms. Yet, their structure makes it possible to prove general analytical results across the entire
parameter space, for example, for all risk-aversion parameters of hedgers and arbitrageurs. In
the case where hedgers are short-lived, we show that a solution exists and we characterize how
it depends on wealth and on model parameters. Moreover, in both the short-lived and long-lived
cases, we characterize the behavior of the solution close to the boundaries.
Our analysis yields new insights on dynamic risk-sharing and asset pricing. We show that the
risk aversion of arbitrageurs is the sum of their static CRRA coefficient and of a forward-looking
component that reflects intertemporal hedging. The latter component makes the risk aversion of
arbitrageurs dependent on parameters of the economy that affect equilibrium prices. For example,
when hedgers are more risk-averse, arbitrageurs become endogenously more risk averse if their
CRRA is smaller than one. This effect can be sufficiently strong to imply that more risk-averse
hedgers may receive less insurance from arbitrageurs in equilibrium. Intuitively, when hedgers are
more risk-averse, expected returns rise steeply following declines in arbitrageur wealth. This makes
arbitrageurs with CRRA smaller than one willing to invest more conservatively, so to preserve
wealth in bad states and earn the high returns.
On the asset-pricing side, we show that arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, in the sense that
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changes in their wealth affect return variances and covariances through amplification and contagion
mechanisms. Endogenous risk is small at both extremes of the wealth distribution: when wealth
is close to zero this is because arbitrageurs hold small positions and hence have a small impact
on prices, and when wealth is close to infinity this is because prices are insensitive to changes in
wealth. The dependence of endogenous risk on arbitrageur wealth can give rise to hump-shaped
patterns of variances, covariances and correlations. It can also cause risk premia, defined as expected
returns in excess of the riskless asset, to increase with arbitrageur wealth for small values of wealth,
even though Sharpe ratios decrease. We show that risk premia always exhibit this pattern when
arbitrageurs’ CRRA coefficient is small, and can exhibit it for larger values as well provided that
hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse. In a similar spirit, we show that risk premia can be larger if
the arbitrageurs’ CRRA coefficient is smaller—precisely because endogenous risk is larger.
Additional asset-pricing results concern liquidity risk and its relationship with expected returns.
A large empirical literature has documented that liquidity varies over time and in a correlated
manner across assets within a class. Moreover, aggregate liquidity appears to be a priced risk factor
and carry a positive premium: assets that underperform the most during times of low aggregate
liquidity earn higher expected returns than assets with otherwise identical characteristics.2 We
map our model to that literature by defining liquidity based on the impact that hedgers have on
prices. We show that liquidity is lower for assets with more volatile cashflows. It also decreases
following losses by arbitrageurs, and this variation is common across assets.
Expected returns in our cross-section of assets are proportional to the covariance with the
portfolio of arbitrageurs, which is the single priced risk factor. That factor may be hard to measure
empirically as the portfolio of arbitrageurs is unobservable. We show, however, that aggregate
liquidity captures that factor. Indeed, because arbitrageurs sell a fraction of their portfolio following
losses, assets that covary the most with their portfolio suffer the most when liquidity decreases.
2Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001)
document the time-variation of liquidity in the stock market and its correlation across stocks. Amihud (2002) and
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) link time-variation in aggregate liquidity to the returns of the aggregate
stock market. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find that aggregate liquidity is a priced
risk factor in the stock market and carries a positive premium. Sadka (2010) and Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou
(2012) find similar results for hedge-fund and private-equity returns, respectively. For more references, see Vayanos
and Wang (2013) who survey the theoretical and empirical literature on market liquidity.
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Thus, an asset’s covariance with aggregate liquidity is proportional to its covariance with the
portfolio of arbitrageurs. On the other hand, the covariances between an asset’s liquidity and
aggregate liquidity or return would not explain expected returns as well. This is because they are
proportional to the volatility of an asset’s cashflows rather than to the asset’s covariance with the
arbitrageurs’ portfolio. The covariance between an asset’s return and other proxies of arbitrageur
wealth, such as the leverage of financial intermediaries, used in recent empirical papers, would also
capture the true priced risk factor.3
We finally characterize when the long-run stationary distribution of arbitrageur wealth is non-
degenerate, and show that it can be bimodal. The stationary distribution can be non-degenerate
because arbitrage activity is self-correcting: when wealth drops, the arbitrageurs’ future expected
returns increase causing wealth to grow faster, and vice-versa. The stationary density becomes
bimodal when hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse. Indeed, because insurance provision in that case
is more profitable, arbitrageur wealth grows fast and large values of wealth can be more likely in
steady state than intermediate values. At the same time, while profitability (per unit of wealth)
is highest when wealth is small, wealth grows away from small values slowly in absolute terms.
Therefore, small values are more likely than intermediate values.
We see our work as bridging three relatively distinct streams of theoretical literature: on liquid-
ity risk, on intermediary asset pricing, and on consumption-based asset pricing with heterogeneous
agents. The first stream focuses on the pricing of liquidity risk in the cross-section of assets. In
Holmstrom and Tirole (2001), firms avoid assets whose return is low when financial constraints are
severe, and these assets offer high expected returns in equilibrium. The covariance between asset
returns and liquidity (less severe constraints) is exogenous. It is instead endogenous in our model
because prices depend on arbitrageur wealth, and this endogeneity is key for our results on a priced
liquidity factor. In Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), illiquidity takes the form of
exogenous time-varying transaction costs. An increase in the costs of trading an asset raises the
expected return that investors require to hold it and lowers its price. A negative covariance between
illiquidity and asset prices arises also in our model but because of an entirely different mechanism:
3Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) find that a single risk factor based on
intermediary leverage can price a large cross-section of assets. As we argue in Section IV, our model is exactly
consistent with this finding, hence suggesting that an explanation with minimal frictions may be possible.
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low liquidity and low prices are endogenous symptoms of low arbitrageur wealth.
The second stream links intermediary capital to liquidity and asset prices. In Gromb and
Vayanos (2002), arbitrageurs intermediate trade between investors in segmented markets, and are
subject to margin constraints. Because of the constraints, the liquidity that arbitrageurs provide
to investors increases in their wealth. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), margin-constrained
arbitrageurs intermediate trade in multiple assets across time periods. Assets with more volatile
cashflows are more sensitive to changes in arbitrageur wealth.4 Garleanu and Pedersen (2011)
introduce margin constraints in an infinite-horizon setting with multiple assets. They show that
assets with higher margin requirements earn higher expected returns and are more sensitive to
changes in the wealth of the margin-constrained agents. This result is suggestive of a priced liquidity
factor. In He and Krishnamurthy (2013), arbitrageurs can raise capital from other investors to invest
in a risky asset over an infinite horizon, but this capital cannot exceed a fixed multiple of their
internal capital. When arbitrageur wealth decreases, the constraint binds, and asset volatility and
expected returns increase. In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), arbitrageurs are more efficient
holders of productive capital and can trade a risky claim to that capital with other investors. The
long-run stationary distribution of arbitrageur wealth can have a bimodal density. A key difference
with all of the above papers is that we derive the effects of arbitrage capital without imposing any
constraints or contracting frictions.
Perhaps the closest papers to ours within the second stream of literature are Xiong (2001) and
Kyle and Xiong (2001). In both papers, arbitrageurs with logarithmic utility over consumption can
trade with exogenous long-term traders and noise traders over an infinite horizon.5 The liquidity
provided by arbitrageurs is increasing in their wealth, and asset volatilities are hump-shaped.
Relative to these papers, we derive the demand of all traders from optimizing behavior and consider
a general number of risky assets. We also show results analytically (rather than via numerical
examples), and do so for general parameter values within which logarithmic preferences are a
restrictive special case.
4In Gromb and Vayanos (2017), arbitrage spreads are positively related to the spreads’ sensitivity to arbitrageur
wealth because both characteristics are positively related to cashflow volatility and convergence horizon.
5Isaenko (2008) studies a related model in which long-term traders maximize CARA utility and there are trans-
action costs.
5
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on consumption-based asset pricing with hetero-
geneous agents, for example, Dumas (1989), Wang (1996), Chan and Kogan (2002), Bhamra and
Uppal (2009), Longstaff and Wang (2012), Basak and Pavlova (2013), Chabakauri (2013), Garleanu
and Panageas (2015), and Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2017). In these papers, agents have CRRA
utility and differ in their risk aversion. As the wealth of the less risk-averse agents increases, Sharpe
ratios decrease, and this can cause volatilities and correlations to be hump-shaped.6 In contrast to
these papers, we assume that only one set of agents has wealth-dependent risk aversion, and we fix
the riskless rate.
We proceed as follows. In Section I we present the model. In Sections II and III we solve
for equilibrium assuming that the risky assets are in zero supply. In Section IV we explore the
implications of our model for liquidity risk. In Section V we show that our main results extend to
positive supply. Section VI concludes. Proofs are in the Internet Appendix.7
I. Model
Time t is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. Uncertainty is described by the N -
dimensional Brownian motion Bt. There is a riskless asset whose instantaneous return is constant
over time and equal to r > 0. This return is exogenous in our model and could be derived from a
linear and riskless production technology. There are N risky assets with cashflows
dDt = D̄dt+ σ
⊤dBt, (1)
where D̄ is a constant N × 1 vector, σ is a constant and invertible N ×N matrix, and ⊤ denotes
transpose. The cashflows (1) are i.i.d. The i.i.d. assumption is for simplicity; we can introduce
persistence without significant changes to our analysis. We denote by St the N × 1 vector of risky-
asset prices at time t, and by s the N × 1 vector consisting of asset supplies measured in terms of
6Longstaff and Wang (2012) show that the hump-shaped pattern extends to expected excess returns. Garleanu
and Pedersen (2011) also find hump-shaped volatilities and expected returns. These findings, however, are shown via
numerical examples rather than general proofs. See also Liu et al. (2015) for a model in which arbitrageurs render
anomalies that they discover endogenously more correlated and this endogenous risk is hump-shaped in wealth.
7The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on the Journal of Finance website.
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number of shares. The prices St are determined endogenously in equilibrium. We set Σ ≡ σ⊤σ.
There are two sets of agents, hedgers and arbitrageurs. Each set forms a continuum with
measure one. Hedgers receive a random endowment u⊤dDt at t+ dt, where u is a constant N × 1
vector. Because the endowment is correlated with the risky assets’ cashflows, it can be hedged
by trading in these assets. We consider two specifications for hedgers’ preferences. Under both
specifications, the hedgers’ wealth does not affect their risk aversion and demand for insurance. We
intentionally simplify the model in this respect, so that we can focus on the supply of insurance,
which is time-varying because of the wealth-dependent risk aversion of arbitrageurs.












where c̄t′ is consumption at t
′ ≥ t, αr is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and ρ̄ is the
subjective discount rate.
• Specification 2: Short-lived hedgers. Hedgers maximize a mean-variance objective over





where dvt is the change in wealth between t and t+ dt, and α is a risk-aversion coefficient.
The risk-aversion coefficient αr under Specification 1 is over consumption, and it yields a risk-
aversion coefficient α over wealth, same to that under Specification 2. The interpretation of hedgers
under Specification 1 is straightforward: they are infinitely lived agents. Under Specification 2,
hedgers can instead be interpreted as overlapping generations living over infinitesimal periods. The
generation born at time t is endowed with initial wealth v̄, and receives the additional endowment
u⊤dDt at t + dt. It consumes all its wealth at t + dt and dies. If preferences over consumption





Under the overlapping generations interpretation, Specification 2 introduces the friction that
future generations of hedgers cannot trade with the current generation. Markets are hence incom-
plete, although they are complete for the current generation of hedgers and for arbitrageurs because
the number N of risky assets is equal to the number of Brownian motions.8 Under Specification 1,
markets are complete for all hedgers and arbitrageurs. While generating a form of incompleteness,
Specification 2 has the advantage of being more tractable. We refer to Specification 1 as long-lived
hedgers, and to Specification 2 as short-lived hedgers.
Arbitrageurs maximize power utility over intertemporal consumption. When the coefficient γ










where ct′ is consumption at t









We assume that ρ > r. As we explain in Section II.C, this assumption ensures that arbitrageurs
do not accumulate infinite wealth over time, in which case wealth effects become irrelevant.
In Sections II and III we solve for equilibrium assuming that the risky assets are in zero supply
(s = 0). With zero supply, the payoffs that hedgers derive at t + dt from their risky positions
at t are the opposite of those derived by arbitrageurs. The same payoffs can be derived through
suitable positions in “short-maturity” assets that pay the same cashflows as the “long-maturity”
assets at t+ dt and zero thereafter, and are in zero supply. This is because the diffusion matrix σ
of cashflows has full rank N . Therefore, an equilibrium with long-maturity assets in zero supply
yields the same risk-sharing, market prices of risk, and wealth dynamics, as one with short-maturity
assets in zero supply. Because price dynamics with short-maturity assets are simpler than with
long-maturity assets, we derive the latter equilibrium first, in Section II. In Section III we confirm
that the two equilibria are equivalent, and derive the long-maturity assets’ prices, expected returns,
8Market incompleteness prevents future generations of hedgers from hedging against the risk that when they are
born arbitrageur wealth is low and the cost of insurance is high.
8
volatilities, and correlations. Although supply is zero, there is aggregate risk because of the hedgers’
endowment, and risk premia are non-zero and time-varying.
We allow supply to be positive in Section V. We show that when hedgers are long-lived, risk-
sharing and asset prices are the same as in the zero-supply equilibrium derived in Sections II and
III, provided that we replace u by s+ u. That is, only the aggregate of the supply u coming from
hedgers and the supply s coming from issuers matters, and not the relative composition. When
hedgers are short-lived, this equivalence does not hold. Yet, key aspects of asset-price behavior
derived in Sections II and III generalize.
For zero supply our model could represent futures markets, with the assets being futures con-
tracts and the arbitrageurs being the speculators. It could also represent the market for insurance
against aggregate risks, for example, weather or earthquakes, with the assets being insurance con-
tracts and the arbitrageurs being the insurers. For positive supply, our model could represent stock
or bond markets, with the arbitrageurs being hedge funds or other agents absorbing demand or
supply imbalances.
II. Equilibrium with Short-Maturity Assets
A new set of N short-maturity assets can be traded at each time t. The assets available at t
pay dDt at t+ dt and zero thereafter. We denote by πtdt the N × 1 vector of prices at which the
assets trade at t, and by dRt ≡ dDt−πtdt the N × 1 vector of returns that the assets earn between




= D̄ − πt, (6)








= σ⊤σ = Σ. (7)
Note that dRt is also a return in excess of the riskless asset since investing πtdt in the riskless asset
yields return rπt(dt)
2, which is negligible relative to dRt. Note also that dRt is a return per share
9
rather than per dollar invested: computing the return per dollar would require dividing dRt by
the price πtdt. When using dollar rather than share returns in the rest of this paper, we will be
mentioning that explicitly.
A. Optimization
Consider first the optimization problem of a long-lived hedger. The hedger’s budget constraint
is
dvt = rvtdt+ x
⊤
t (dDt − πtdt) + u⊤dDt − c̄tdt, (8)
where xt is the hedger’s position in the risky assets at time t and vt is the hedger’s wealth. The
first term in the right-hand side of (8) is the return from investing in the riskless asset, the second
term is the return from investing in the risky assets, the third term is the endowment (with u
characterizing the endowment’s sensitivity to asset returns), and the fourth term is consumption.
We solve the hedger’s optimization problem using dynamic programming and conjecture the value
function
V (vt, wt) = −e−[αvt+F (wt)], (9)
where F (wt) is a scalar function of wt. The hedger’s value function over wealth has the same
negative-exponential form as the utility function over consumption, with the risk-aversion coefficient
being α rather than αr . In addition, the value function depends on the wealth of arbitrageurs since
the latter affects asset prices πt. Arbitrageur wealth is the only state variable in our model.
PROPOSITION 1: Given the value function (9), the optimal policy of a long-lived hedger at time
t is to consume
c̄t = rvt +
r
α
[F (wt)− log(r)] (10)








in the risky assets.
The hedger’s optimal demand for the risky assets consists of three components, which correspond
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to the three terms in the right-hand side of (11). The first term is a standard mean-variance demand.
It consists of an investment in the tangent portfolio, scaled by the hedger’s risk-aversion coefficient
α. The tangent portfolio is the inverse of the covariance matrix Σ of asset returns times the vector
D̄ − πt of expected returns. The second term is a demand to hedge endowment risk. It consists
of a short position in the portfolio u, which characterizes the sensitivity of hedgers’ endowment to
asset returns. Selling short an asset n for which un > 0 yields a high payoff when dDnt is low,
which when is the endowment is also low. The third term is an intertemporal hedging demand as
in Merton (1971). Changes in arbitrageur wealth, the only state variable in our model, affect the
terms at which hedgers can obtain insurance, and must be hedged against. Intertemporal hedging
is accomplished by holding a portfolio with weights proportional to the sensitivity of arbitrageur
wealth to asset returns. That sensitivity is simply the portfolio yt of arbitrageurs. Hence, the
intertemporal hedging demand is a scaled version of yt, as the third term in (11) confirms.
When the hedger is short-lived, the budget constraint (8) does not include consumption, and the
hedger’s optimal demand for the risky assets does not include the intertemporal hedging component.
The other two terms in (11), however, remain the same. Hence, the case of a short-lived hedger
can be nested into that of a long-lived hedger by setting the function F (wt) to zero.





in the risky assets.
Consider next the optimization problem of an arbitrageur. The arbitrageur’s budget constraint
is
dwt = rwtdt+ y
⊤
t (dDt − πtdt)− ctdt, (13)
where yt is the arbitrageur’s position in the risky assets at time t and wt is the arbitrageur’s wealth.
The first term in the right-hand side of (13) is the return from investing in the riskless asset, the
second term is the return from investing in the risky assets, and the third term is consumption.
The arbitrageur’s value function depends not only on his own wealth wt, but also on the aggregate
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wealth of all arbitrageurs since the latter affects asset prices πt. In equilibrium own wealth and
aggregate wealth coincide because all arbitrageurs are symmetric and in measure one. For the
purposes of optimization, however, we need to make the distinction. We reserve the notation wt for
aggregate wealth and denote own wealth by ŵt. We likewise use (ct, yt) for aggregate consumption
and position in the assets, and denote own consumption and position by (ĉt, ŷt). We conjecture the
value function




for γ ̸= 1, and
V (ŵt, wt) =
1
ρ
log(ŵt) + q1(wt) (15)
for γ = 1, where q(wt) and q1(wt) are scalar functions of wt. We set q(wt) =
1
ρ for γ = 1.
PROPOSITION 3: Given the value function (14) and (15), the optimal policy of an arbitrageur at















in the risky assets.
The arbitrageur’s optimal consumption is proportional to his wealth ŵt, with the proportion-
ality coefficient q(wt)
− 1
γ being a function of aggregate arbitrageur wealth wt. The arbitrageur’s
optimal demand for the risky assets consists of two components, which correspond to the two terms
in the right-hand side of (17) and are analogous to those for hedgers. The first term consists of
an investment in the tangent portfolio, scaled by the arbitrageur’s coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion γŵt . The second term is an intertemporal hedging demand. The arbitrageur hedges against
changes in aggregate arbitrageur wealth since these affect asset prices. Intertemporal hedging is
accomplished by holding a portfolio with weights proportional to the sensitivity of aggregate arbi-
trageur wealth to asset returns. Since this sensitivity is the aggregate portfolio yt of arbitrageurs,
the intertemporal hedging demand is a scaled version of yt.
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B. Equilibrium Characterization and Existence
Since in equilibrium all arbitrageurs are symmetric and in measure one, their aggregate position
coincides with each arbitrageur’s position and the same is true for wealth. Setting ŷt = yt and













Arbitrageurs’ investment in the tangent portfolio is scaled by A(wt), which can be interpreted as a
coefficient of dynamic risk aversion. It is the sum of the static coefficient of absolute risk aversion
γ
wt
, and of the term − q
′(wt)
q(wt)
which corresponds to the intertemporal hedging demand and hence
reflects dynamic considerations. Suppose, for example, that q(wt) is decreasing, a property which
holds for γ < 1, as we show in Theorem 1. Equation (17) then implies that the intertemporal
hedging demand is negative and lowers the arbitrageurs’ position. The negative hedging demand
is reflected in (18) through a larger coefficient of dynamic risk aversion A(wt). In Section II.C.2 we
provide economic intuition for the sign of q′(wt) and of the intertemporal hedging demand.
A similar calculation can be made for hedgers using the market-clearing equation
xt + yt = 0. (20)
Setting yt = −xt in (11), we find that the aggregate position of hedgers is
xt =
Σ−1(D̄ − πt)− αu
α− F ′(wt)
. (21)
Substituting (18) and (21) into (20), we find that asset prices πt are











Arbitrageurs buy a fraction of the portfolio u, which is the portfolio that hedgers want to sell to
hedge their endowment risk. They buy a larger fraction of u, hence supplying more insurance
to hedgers, when their coefficient of dynamic risk aversion A(wt) is smaller and the hedgers’ risk-
aversion coefficient α is larger. The degree of insurance supplied by arbitrageurs also depends on the
hedgers’ intertemporal hedging demand, as reflected through the function F ′(wt). When hedgers
are short-lived, F (wt) = 0 and hence F
′(wt) = 0. When instead they are long-lived, our numerical
solutions indicate that F ′(wt) > 0. Therefore, the hedgers’ intertemporal hedging motive makes
them demand more insurance from arbitrageurs. The intuition is that hedgers seek to hedge against
the event that arbitrageurs will become poorer in the future because in that event insurance will
be supplied to them at worse terms. Arbitrageurs become poorer when assets they have bought
from hedgers under-perform. An individual hedger can hedge against that event by selling an even
larger amount of those assets to arbitrageurs. As a consequence, the intertemporal hedging demand
makes the hedgers collectively demand more insurance from arbitrageurs.
Equation (22) implies that expected asset returns D̄−πt are proportional to the covariance with
the portfolio u, which is the single priced risk factor in our model. The risk premium αA(wt)α+A(wt)−F ′(wt)
of that factor depends on arbitrageur wealth, and is hence time-varying. The arbitrageurs’ Sharpe
ratio, defined as the expected return of their portfolio divided by the portfolio’s standard deviation,
also depends on their wealth. Using (22) and (23), we find that the Sharpe ratio is
SRt ≡







Substituting the hedgers’ optimal policy from Proposition 1 into their Bellman equation (Equa-
tion (IA6), derived in the proof of Proposition 2), and using the dynamics that arbitrageur wealth
follows in equilibrium, we can derive an ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the function F (wt).
Following the same procedure for arbitrageurs, we can derive an ODE for the function q(wt). To
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This parameter is larger when the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α or endowment variance u⊤Σu
are larger, or the arbitrageurs’ subjective discount rate ρ is smaller, or the riskless rate r is larger.














The function F (wt) is equal to zero when hedgers are short-lived, and solves the ODE
1 =









′′(wt)−A(wt) [2α+A(wt)− 2F ′(wt)]}
[α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)]2
(27)
when they are long-lived.
Solving for equilibrium when hedgers are short-lived amounts to solving the ODE (26) with the
function F (wt) set to zero. That ODE involves the functions q(wt) and A(wt). Since, however,
A(wt) depends on q(wt) and q
′(wt), as described in (19), (26) can be written as a second-order
ODE in the single function q(wt). That ODE involves non-linear terms in both q(wt) and q
′(wt).
Solving for equilibrium when hedgers are long-lived amounts to solving the ODEs (26) and (27).
These can be written as a system of second-order non-linear ODEs in q(wt) and F (wt). We derive
boundary conditions for the two ODEs through a small set of economic properties which we assume
should hold when wt goes to zero and to infinity. We next state and motivate these properties.
When wt goes to zero and to infinity, expected asset returns should converge to finite limits:
if the limits were infinite, insurance would become infinitely costly, and hedgers would not only
refrain from buying it but would also be willing to supply it. Since expected returns converge to
finite limits and hedgers have negative exponential utility, their value function should also converge
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to finite limits, holding their wealth vt constant. Equation (9) then implies that F (wt) should
converge to finite limits when wt goes to zero and to infinity.
That expected returns converge to finite limits when wt goes to zero and to infinity does not
imply that an arbitrageur’s value function should do the same, holding the arbitrageur’s own wealth
ŵt constant. Indeed, because arbitrageurs have power utility, their value function can become
infinite when expected returns are large enough.9 For wt going to infinity, however, the finite limit
of dollar expected returns is the riskless rate r, as arbitrageurs eliminate all risk premia. Moreover,
because the arbitrageurs’ subjective discount rate ρ exceeds r, their value function does converge
to a finite limit, and so does q(wt).
10 The limit of q(wt) must further be positive: since q(wt) is the
marginal utility of wealth of an arbitrageur with wealth ŵt = 1, and the arbitrageur can always
invest in the riskless asset, q(wt) must exceed a positive bound. This is the boundary condition
for q(wt) at infinity. The boundary condition at zero is through A(wt). Since arbitrageurs have
power utility and risk premia are finite and non-zero, the arbitrageurs’ position in the risky assets
as a fraction of their wealth should converge to a finite non-zero limit (while converging to zero
in absolute terms). Equation (18) then implies that A(wt)wt should converge to a positive limit.
Note that all the boundary conditions that we impose concern the existence of finite limits rather
than the limits’ exact values.
Theorem 1 provides a comprehensive analysis of the equilibrium when hedgers are short-lived,
and a partial analysis when they are long-lived. In the short-lived case, we show that a solution to
the ODE (26) with F (wt) = 0 and the boundary conditions on q(wt) and A(wt) exists. We also
characterize monotonicity properties of the solution and show that the limits at zero and infinity
are uniquely determined. In the long-lived case, we have not been able to show existence and
monotonicity properties. We show, however, that the limits at zero and infinity are the same as in
the short-lived case.
THEOREM 1: When hedgers are short-lived, a solution to the ODE (26) with F (wt) = 0 and
positive limits of A(wt)wt at zero and q(wt) at infinity exists. The solution has the following
9Merton (1971) shows than when dollar return distributions are time-invariant and expected returns are finite,
the value function remains finite under negative exponential utility but can become infinite under power utility.
10The result that the value function under power utility is finite when dollar return distributions are time-invariant,
expected returns are equal to the riskless rate r, and the subjective discount rate exceeds r is in Merton (1971).
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properties:
• The function A(wt) is decreasing.




• If γ < 1, then 1wt > A(wt) >
γ
wt
and q(wt) is decreasing.
• If γ > 1, then 1wt < A(wt) <
γ
wt
and q(wt) is increasing.
• If γ < K, where K < 1 is the unique positive solution of








then limwt→0A(wt)wt = K and limwt→0 q(wt) = ∞.
• If γ > K, then limwt→0A(wt)wt = γ and limwt→0 q(wt) ∈ (0,∞).
Suppose next that hedgers are long-lived, and that a solution to the system of ODEs (26) and (27)
with positive limits of A(wt)wt at zero and q(wt) at infinity, and finite limits of F (wt) at zero and
infinity, exists. Suppose additionally that F ′(wt)wt and F
′′(wt)w
2
t have (finite or infinite) limits at
zero and infinity. The solution has the following properties:
• The limits of A(wt)wt and q(wt) at zero and infinity are as in the case of short-lived hedgers.
• limwt→0 F (wt) = log(r) +
αu⊤D̄+ρ̄−r−z(ρ−r)
r and limwt→∞ F (wt) = log(r) +
αu⊤D̄+ρ̄−r
r .
• The limits of [A(wt)− F ′(wt)]wt at zero and infinity are the same as those of A(wt)wt.
The basic idea of our existence proof is to start with a finite interval [ϵ,M ] and show that there
exists a unique solution to the ODE (26) with the limits of A(wt)wt at zero and infinity imposed
as boundary conditions at ϵ and M , respectively. We next show that when ϵ converges to zero and
M to infinity, that solution converges to a solution over (0,∞). Our convergence proof uses the
monotonicity of the solution with respect to ϵ and M , which in turn follows from a single-crossing
property. Our construction yields a unique solution over (0,∞), although it does not rule out
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that other solutions (constructed differently) may exist. Uniqueness of our constructed solution
allows us to examine how that solution moves in response to exogenous parameters: we perform
the comparative statics on the solution over [ϵ,M ] and take the limit when ϵ converges to zero
and M to infinity. Our existence proof concerns only short-lived hedgers; when stating results on
long-lived hedgers in the rest of this paper, we assume that a solution to the system of ODEs (26)
and (27) as described in Theorem 1 exists.
In Section II.C we derive economic implications of the results shown in Theorem 1, as well as
some additional properties. We examine how positions and returns depend on arbitrageur wealth
(Section II.C.1), how dynamic risk aversion differs from its static counterpart (Section II.C.2), and
what the long-run dynamics of arbitrageur wealth are (Section II.C.3).
C. Equilibrium Properties
C.1. Wealth Effects
Theorem 1 shows that when hedgers are short-lived, an increase in the wealth wt of arbitrageurs
causes arbitrageur dynamic risk aversion A(wt) to decline. A decline in A(wt) results in more
insurance supplied to hedgers: arbitrageur positions become more positive for positive elements of
u, which correspond to assets that hedgers want to sell, and more negative for negative elements of
u, which correspond to assets that hedgers want to buy. Expected asset returns, which reflect the
cost of the insurance, become smaller in absolute value: less positive for positive elements of u and
less negative for negative elements of u. The same is true for the market prices of the Brownian
risks, that is, the expected returns per unit of risk exposure, and for the arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio.
COROLLARY 1: When hedgers are short-lived, an increase in arbitrageur wealth wt:
(i) Raises the position of arbitrageurs in each asset in absolute value.
(ii) Lowers the expected return of each asset in absolute value.
(iii) Lowers the market price of each Brownian risk in absolute value.
(iv) Lowers the arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio.
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The results of Corollary 1 appear consistent with the empirical findings of Kang, Rouwenhorst,
and Tang (2016). That paper finds that commodity futures in which hedgers held long positions
on average over the previous year earn negative expected returns. At the same time, commodity
futures in which hedgers made a net purchase over the previous week (increasing their long position
or reducing their short position) earn positive expected returns. In our model, hedgers hold long
positions on average in assets n with un < 0, and these assets earn negative expected returns. At
the same time, Corollary 1 implies that hedgers increase these long positions following an increase
in arbitrageur wealth wt, and the negative expected returns become less negative. Moreover,
hedgers reduce their short positions in assets n with un > 0 following a decline in wt, and the
positive expected returns of these assets become more positive. Hence, net purchases of hedgers
following shocks to wt can on average (across both positive and negative shocks) be associated
with positive expected returns. Hedging demand u and arbitrageur wealth wt can thus generate
relationships between positions and expected returns that are opposite and operate at different
frequencies, consistent with the empirical evidence. In a similar spirit, Cheng and Xiong (2014)
find that changes in the hedging demand of commodity hedgers do not appear to be the main driver
of short-term changes in their positions.11
When hedgers are long-lived, changes in the wealth of arbitrageurs affect not only their dynamic
risk aversion A(wt) but also the hedgers’ intertemporal hedging demand, whose strength is captured
by the function F ′(wt) > 0. Recall that long-lived hedgers seek to hedge against the event that
arbitrageurs will become poorer in the future because in that event insurance will be supplied to
them at worse terms. Moreover, because of that intertemporal hedging motive, hedgers demand
more insurance. Our numerical solutions indicate that when arbitrageur wealth wt increases, both
A(wt) and F
′(wt) decrease. In the case of F
′(wt), this is because the terms of insurance become
less sensitive to wt for larger values of wt.
The interplay between increased supply of insurance (lower A(wt)) and declining demand for
it (lower F ′(wt)) can give rise to non-monotonic patterns. Consider, for example, arbitrageur
11Cheng and Xiong (2015) find that commodity hedgers scale down their positions when aggregate volatility (mea-
sured by VIX) increases. This is again suggestive of hedgers’ positions changing in the short term for reasons unrelated
to their hedging demand (which should increase when volatility increases): during volatile times, arbitrageurs may
be becoming more constrained or risk-averse, an effect derived in Corollary 2 in the case γ < 1.
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positions, which increase in absolute value when A(wt)− F ′(wt) declines, as shown in (23). When
the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α is high, positions are hump-shaped in wt: they increase in
absolute value for small values of wt as A(wt) declines, and decrease for larger values of wt as
F ′(wt) declines. When instead α is low, the variation in F
′(wt) is dominated by that in A(wt), and
positions increase in absolute value for all values of wt, as in Corollary 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of arbitrageur dynamic risk aversion and positions. The plots
in the left show dynamic risk aversion A(wt). The plots in the middle show the position ynt in
an asset n, expressed as a fraction of the position un that hedgers want to hedge. All these plots
concern the case where hedgers are long-lived. The plots in the right express positions relative to
the case where hedgers are short-lived. The blue solid line represents the baseline case, which is
the same in all plots. The plots at the top show that positions increase with wt in the baseline case
but become hump-shaped when the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α increases. For the larger
value of α, arbitrageurs can over-insure hedgers, buying the full position that they want to hedge
and holding an additional long position. Over-insurance introduces a large deviation relative to
the case of short-lived hedgers, as the top-right figure shows. The plots at the bottom show that
arbitrageurs provide less insurance to hedgers when their risk-aversion coefficient γ increases.
C.2. Dynamic Risk Aversion
Recall from (19) that the dynamic risk aversion A(wt) of arbitrageurs is the sum of the static co-
efficient of absolute risk aversion γwt , and of the term −
q′(wt)
q(wt)
which corresponds to the intertemporal
hedging demand. In this section we examine, drawing on the results of Theorem 1, how dynamic
and static risk aversion differ, or equivalently what the properties of intertemporal hedging demand
are. We start with the case of short-lived hedgers, and examine how the results carry through to
long-lived hedgers at the end of this section.
For γ < 1, the intertemporal hedging demand raises A(wt) above
γ
wt
, while the opposite is
true for γ > 1. The difference between the two cases lies in the behavior of the marginal utility
of arbitrageur wealth, which is q(wt) for an arbitrageur with wealth ŵt = 1. For γ < 1, q(wt) is
decreasing in wt, meaning that the arbitrageur has higher marginal utility in states where aggregate
arbitrageur wealth wt is low. This is because in the low-wt states expected returns are high, and
20






























































Figure 1: Arbitrageur dynamic risk aversion A(wt) and positions yt as a function
of arbitrageur wealth wt. The plots in the left show A(wt). The plots in the middle
show ynt for an asset n, expressed as a fraction of the position un that hedgers want
to hedge. All these plots concern the case where hedgers are long-lived. The plots in
the right express positions relative to the case where hedgers are short-lived. All plots
assume two symmetric and uncorrelated risky assets, and set the annualized standard
deviation of the hedgers’ endowment
√
u⊤Σu to 15%, the arbitrageurs’ subjective
discount rate ρ to 4%, and the riskless rate r to 2%. In the baseline case, represented
by the blue solid line in all plots, the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α is set to
2 and the arbitrageurs’ relative risk-aversion coefficient γ to 0.5. (By normalizing
the hedgers’ wealth to one, via a choice of numeraire, we can interpret α as their
coefficient of relative risk aversion and
√
u⊤Σu as the annualized standard deviation
of their endowment as a fraction of their wealth.) Under these choices, the parameters
z and K are 2.25 and 0.59, respectively. The plots at the top examine the effect of
raising α to 4, and the plots at the bottom examine the effect of raising γ to 2.
hence the arbitrageur earns a high return on wealth. By seeking to preserve wealth in those states,
so to earn the high return by investing it, the arbitrageur scales back his positions, behaving as more
risk-averse than in the absence of intertemporal hedging. For γ > 1 instead, q(wt) is increasing in
wt, meaning that the arbitrageur has lower marginal utility in low-wt states. This is because the
high return on wealth in those states is associated with high utility of future consumption. Hence,
it is discounted by low marginal utility, and the latter effect dominates for γ > 1.
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. Although the intertemporal hedging demand raises A(wt) for γ < 1, A(wt) remains
smaller than for γ = 1. Conversely, although the intertemporal hedging demand lowers A(wt) for
γ > 1, A(wt) remains larger than for γ = 1. These comparisons do not imply, however, that the
relative contribution of the intertemporal hedging demand to A(wt) is small; we next point out
that it is large in some cases.
When wt goes to infinity, A(wt) ≈ γwt . Hence, A(wt) is driven purely by the static component,
and the relative contribution of the intertemporal hedging demand converges to zero. The same
result holds when wt goes to zero if γ exceeds a threshold K ∈ (0, 1). If instead γ < K, A(wt) ≈ Kwt .




and K−γK in relative terms. If, in particular, γ is close to zero, A(wt) is almost purely driven by
the intertemporal hedging demand. The difference between the cases γ > K and γ < K lies in the
behavior of the marginal utility q(wt) when wt goes to zero. If γ > K, then q(wt) converges to
a finite limit and hence the ratio of − q
′(wt)
q(wt)
to γwt must converge to zero. If instead γ < K, then
q(wt) converges to infinity and hence − q
′(wt)
q(wt)
can be larger than γwt .
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Equation (28) implies that the threshold K increases with the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient
α and endowment variance u⊤Σu. Hence, when hedgers are more risk averse or their endowment is
more volatile, arbitrageurs with γ < K also become more risk averse for wt close to zero. Theorem
2 generalizes these results to any γ < 1 and wt, and shows that the opposite results hold for γ > 1.
THEOREM 2: Suppose that hedgers are short-lived. For any given level of arbitrageur wealth wt,
the following comparative statics hold:
(i) An increase in the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α raises arbitrageur dynamic risk aversion
A(wt) if γ < 1, and lowers it if γ > 1.
(ii) An increase in the hedgers’ endowment variance u⊤Σu raises arbitrageur dynamic risk aver-
sion A(wt) if γ < 1, and lowers it if γ > 1.
12The region γ < K in which q(wt) converges to infinity when wt goes to zero is a subset of the region γ < 1 in
which q(wt) is decreasing. The former region is also the one in which the value function of an arbitrageur facing the
time-invariant expected returns that arise in equilibrium when wt = 0 (no arbitrageurs) is infinite.
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The intuition for Theorem 2 is that for larger values of α and u⊤Σu, expected returns are
more sensitive to changes in arbitrageur wealth wt, rising more steeply when wt declines. Hence,
arbitrageurs with γ < 1 have a marginal utility that also rises more steeply following declines in
wt. This makes them even more willing to preserve wealth in the low-wt states, and raises their
dynamic risk aversion A(wt). Arbitrageurs with γ > 1, by contrast, have a marginal utility that
drops more steeply following declines in wt, and this lowers A(wt).
The comparative statics of A(wt) yield comparative statics for arbitrageur positions and Sharpe
ratios. Most surprising among these is that arbitrageurs can supply less insurance to hedgers when
the latter become more risk averse. Following an increase in α, supplying insurance becomes more
profitable for arbitrageurs. If arbitrageur risk aversion included only the static component, which
does not depend on α, arbitrageurs would therefore supply more insurance. Because of the intertem-
poral hedging demand, however, the dynamic risk aversion of arbitrageurs with γ < 1 increases.
Moreover, this effect can dominate, inducing arbitrageurs to supply less insurance. Arbitrageurs
with γ ≥ 1 instead supply more insurance because their dynamic risk aversion decreases. When
γ ≤ 1, arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio increases because both hedgers and arbitrageurs become more
risk averse. The comparative statics with respect to u⊤Σu are along similar lines.
COROLLARY 2: Suppose that hedgers are short-lived. For any given level of arbitrageur wealth
wt, the following comparative statics hold:
(i) An increase in the hedgers’ risk aversion coefficient α raises the arbitrageurs’ position in
absolute value when γ ≥ 1 and lowers it when γ < K, z < 1 and wt is small. It raises the
arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio when γ ≤ 1.
(ii) An increase in the variance u⊤Σu of hedgers’ endowment raises the arbitrageurs’ position in
absolute value when γ > 1 and lowers it when γ < 1. It raises the arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio
when γ ≤ 1.
When hedgers are long-lived, an increase in α lowers the arbitrageurs’ position in absolute value
when γ < K, z < 1 and wt is small.
The result that an increase in α can induce the arbitrageurs to supply less insurance to hedgers
carries through to long-lived hedgers. This is because the asymptotic behavior of A(wt) for wt
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close to zero is the same as with short-lived hedgers. Our numerical solutions indicate that the
remaining comparative statics in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 also extend to long-lived hedgers.
C.3. Stationary Distribution
We next derive the long-run dynamics of arbitrageur wealth.































over the support (0,∞). If z < 1, then wealth converges to zero in the long run.
Arbitrageur wealth has a non-degenerate stationary density if the parameter z defined in (25)
exceeds one. That is, the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient α and endowment variance u⊤Σu must
be large enough relative to the difference between the arbitrageurs’ subjective discount rate ρ and
the riskless rate r. Note that this result is valid both when hedgers are short-lived and when they
are long-lived.
The existence of a non-degenerate stationary density is related to the dynamics of arbitrageur
wealth being self-correcting : when wealth drops, the arbitrageurs’ future expected returns increase
causing wealth to grow faster, and vice-versa. To explain the relationship and why the condition
z > 1 is required, we recall the standard Merton (1971) portfolio optimization problem in which
an infinitely-lived investor with CRRA coefficient γ can invest in a riskless rate r and in N risky
assets whose returns have expectation given by a vector µ and covariance given by a matrix Σ. The




µ⊤Σ−1µ > ρ, (30)
that is, the riskless rate plus one-half of the squared Sharpe ratio achieved from investing in the
risky assets exceeds the investor’s subjective discount rate ρ. When instead (30) holds in the
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opposite direction, wealth converges to zero. Intuitively, wealth converges to infinity when the
investor accumulates wealth at a rate that exceeds sufficiently the rate at which he consumes.
Our model differs from the Merton problem because the arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio is endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium and decreases in their wealth (Corollary 1). Using (24) to sub-








u⊤Σu > ρ. (31)
Transposing the result from the Merton problem thus suggests that there are three possibilities for
the long-run dynamics of arbitrageur wealth. If (31) is satisfied for all values of wt, then wealth
converges to infinity. If (31) is violated for all values of wt, then wealth converges to zero. If,
finally, (31) is violated for large values but is satisfied for small values, neither convergence occurs
and wealth has a non-degenerate stationary density.
Since Theorem 1 shows that A(wt) converges to zero when wt goes to infinity, (31) is satisfied
for large values of wt if r > ρ. Our assumption ρ > r hence implies that (31) is violated for large
wt, and rules out that wealth converges to infinity in the long run. To examine whether (31) is
satisfied for small values of wt, we recall from Theorem 1 that A(wt) is of order
1
wt
for wt close to
zero, and that limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt = 0. Hence, (31) is satisfied for small wt if r +
α2u⊤Σu
2 > ρ. This
condition is equivalent to z > 1, which is exactly what Proposition 5 requires for a non-degenerate
stationary density to exist. Proposition 6 computes the density in closed form when hedgers are
short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility (γ = 1).
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that hedgers are short-lived, arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility (γ =
1), and z > 1. The stationary density d(wt):
(i) Is decreasing in wt if z <
27
8 .
(ii) Is bimodal in wt otherwise: decreasing in wt for wt ∈ (0,m1), increasing in wt for wt ∈




2 + (3− 2z)αwt + 1 = 0. (32)
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(iii) Shifts to the right in the monotone likelihood ratio sense when α or u⊤Σu increase.
The stationary density has two possible shapes. When z is not much larger than one, it is
decreasing in arbitrageur wealth wt, and so values of wt close to zero are more likely than larger
values. When instead z is sufficiently larger than one, the stationary density becomes bimodal,
with the two maxima being zero and an interior point m2 of the support. Values of wt close to the
maxima are more likely than intermediate values, meaning that the economy spends more time at
these values than in the middle. The intuition is that when the hedgers’ risk-aversion coefficient
α and endowment variance u⊤Σu are large, arbitrageurs earn high expected returns for providing
insurance, and their wealth grows fast. Therefore, large values of wt can be more likely in steady
state than intermediate values. At the same time, while expected returns are highest when wealth
is small, wealth grows away from small values slowly in absolute terms. Therefore, small values of
wt are more likely than intermediate values.
Using the long-run stationary distribution, we can perform “unconditional” comparative statics.
For example, rather than examining how the arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio depends on α conditionally
on wt, we can examine how it depends on α unconditionally, in expectation over the stationary
distribution of wt. The unconditional comparative statics can differ from the conditional ones.
For example, while an increase in α and u⊤Σu raises the conditional Sharpe ratio when γ ≤ 1
(Corollary 2), it can lower its unconditional expectation. Intuitively, for larger values of α and
u⊤Σu, arbitrageur wealth grows faster, and its stationary density shifts to the right (Proposition
6). Therefore, while the conditional Sharpe ratio increases, its unconditional expectation can
decrease because large values of wealth, which yield low Sharpe ratios, become more likely.
III. Equilibrium with Long-Maturity Assets
We conjecture that in equilibrium the price vector St of the long-maturity assets follows the Ito
process
dSt = µStdt+ σ
⊤
StdBt, (33)
where µSt is a N × 1 vector and σSt is a N ×N matrix. We denote by dRt ≡ dSt + dDt − rStdt
the N × 1 vector of returns that the long-maturity assets earn between t and t+ dt in excess of the
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riskless asset. Note as in the case of short-maturity assets, dRt is a return per share rather than
per dollar invested. Equations (1) and (33) imply that the instantaneous expected excess returns
of the long-maturity assets are
Et(dRt)
dt
= µSt + D̄ − rSt, (34)
and the instantaneous covariance matrix of returns is
Vart(dRt)
dt
= (σSt + σ)
⊤(σSt + σ). (35)
A. Equivalence with Short-Maturity Assets
With long-maturity assets, the budget constraint (8) of a long-lived hedger becomes
dvt = rvtdt+X
⊤
t (dSt + dDt − rStdt) + u⊤dDt − c̄tdt, (36)
where Xt is the hedger’s position in the risky assets at time t. The budget constraint of a short-
lived hedger is derived from (36) by excluding consumption. The budget constraint (13) of an
arbitrageur becomes
dwt = rwtdt+ Y
⊤
t (dSt + dDt − rStdt)− ctdt, (37)
where Yt is the arbitrageur’s position in the risky assets at time t. The market clearing equation
(20) becomes
Xt + Yt = 0. (38)
Because the diffusion matrix σ of cashflows has full rank N , an equilibrium with long-maturity
assets yields the same risk-sharing, market prices of risk, and wealth dynamics, as one with short-
maturity assets.
LEMMA 1: An equilibrium (St, Xt, Yt) with long-maturity assets can be constructed from an equi-
librium (πt, xt, yt) with short-maturity assets by:









(µSt + D̄ − rSt). (39)
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• Choosing the asset positions Xt of hedgers and Yt of arbitrageurs such that
σxt = (σSt + σ)Xt, (40)
σyt = (σSt + σ)Yt. (41)
In the equilibrium with long-maturity assets the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth, the exposures of
hedgers and arbitrageurs to the Brownian shocks, the market prices of the Brownian risks, and the
arbitrageurs’ Sharpe ratio are the same as in the equilibrium with short-maturity assets.
Equations (40) and (41) construct positions of hedgers and arbitrageurs in the long-maturity
assets so that the exposures to the underlying Brownian shocks are the same as with short-maturity
assets. Equation (39) constructs a price process such that the market prices of the Brownian risks
are also the same. Given this price process, risk exposures are optimal and clear the markets,
because these properties also hold with short-maturity assets.
B. Asset Prices and Returns
The prices St of the long-maturity assets are a function of arbitrageur wealth wt, which is the
only state variable in our model. Using Ito’s lemma to compute the drift µSt and diffusion σSt of
the price process as a function of the dynamics of wt, and substituting into (39), we can determine
S(wt) up to an ODE for a scalar function.










































The ODE (43) is linear in g(wt). The boundary conditions that we require are that g(wt)
converges to finite limits at zero and infinity. As with the ODEs in Section II, we only assume
the existence of finite limits rather than the limits’ exact values. Theorem 3 shows that a solution
g(wt) to the ODE (43) exists when hedgers are short-lived, is negative and increasing in wt, and
converges to −αr and to zero, respectively, when wt goes to zero and to infinity. The theorem also
shows that when hedgers are long-lived, the limits are as in the short-lived case.
THEOREM 3: When hedgers are short-lived, a solution to the ODE (43) with finite limits at zero
and infinity exists. The solution has the following properties:
• The function g(wt) is negative and increasing.
• limwt→0 g(wt) = −αr and limwt→∞ g(wt) = 0.
When hedgers are long-lived, the limits of g(wt) at zero and infinity are the same as when they are
short-lived, provided that a solution to the ODE (43) with finite limits exists.
Proposition 7 shows that asset prices (given in (42)) are the sum of two terms. The first term,
D̄
r , is the present value of the assets’ expected cashflows D̄, discounted at the riskless rate r. Prices
would equal that present value if arbitrageurs had infinite wealth since they would then eliminate
all risk premia, rendering the expected dollar returns on all assets equal to r. The second term,
g(wt)Σu, reflects the risk premia arising from arbitrageur wealth wt being finite. Consider an asset
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n that covaries positively with the portfolio u that hedgers want to sell, that is, (Σu)n > 0. In
the absence of arbitrageurs, that asset would trade at a discount relative to D̄nr . Arbitrageurs
cause that discount to decrease, and the more so the wealthier they are. Hence, the asset price
Sn =
D̄n
r + g(wt)(Σu)n increases in wt and converges to
D̄n
r when wt goes to infinity. Theorem 3
shows that g(wt) is indeed increasing and converges to zero at infinity.
Since changes in arbitrageur wealth wt affect the prices of long-maturity assets, they also impact
the assets’ returns. Proposition 7 shows that the covariance matrix of asset returns (given in (45))
is the sum of a “fundamental” component Σ, driven purely by shocks to assets’ underlying cashflows





Σuu⊤Σ, introduced because cashflow
shocks affect wt which affects returns. Endogenous risk does not arise with short-maturity assets
since their returns are risky only because of the payoff dDt, which is not sensitive to changes in wt.
The endogenous covariance between an asset pair (n, n′) depends on whether the corresponding
components of the vector Σu have the same or opposite signs. Suppose, for example, that (Σu)n > 0
and (Σu)n′ > 0, in which case both assets would trade at a discount in the arbitrageurs’ absence.
An increase in arbitrageur wealth wt causes the prices of both assets to increase, resulting in positive
endogenous covariance. Suppose instead that (Σu)n < 0, in which case demand from hedgers would
cause asset n to trade at a premium in the arbitrageurs’ absence. Asset n’s price would then drop
following an increase in wt, resulting in negative endogenous covariance with asset n
′.
Endogenous risk is small at both extremes of the wealth distribution and larger in the middle.
When arbitrageur wealth wt is close to zero, arbitrageurs hold small positions in absolute terms
(i.e., not as a fraction of wt). Therefore, changes in wt are small and have a small impact on prices.
When instead wt is close to infinity, arbitrageurs absorb the entire portfolio u that hedgers want
to sell. Changes in wt are hence larger, but prices are insensitive to those changes. These effects
can be seen in the expression (46) for f(wt): this function is small for small wt because A(wt) is
large (resulting in small positions by arbitrageurs), and for large wt because g
′(wt) is small (low
price sensitivity to wt). Since the endogenous variance is larger in the middle than in the extremes,
total variance can be hump-shaped in wt. Total covariance and correlation can be hump-shaped
or inverse hump-shaped depending on whether the endogenous covariance is positive or negative,
respectively. Proposition 8 confirms the hump shapes (i.e., shows that there is only one hump) in
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the case where hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility.
PROPOSITION 8: The effects of a change in arbitrageur wealth wt on the volatility of asset returns
and on return covariance and correlation converge to zero when wt goes to zero and to infinity.
When hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility, an increase in wt has:
(i) A hump-shaped effect on the volatility of asset returns. The hump peaks at a value that is
common to all assets.
(ii) The same hump-shaped effect on the covariance between the returns of assets n and n′ if
(Σu)n(Σu)n′ > 0, and the opposite, that is, inverse hump-shaped, effect if (Σu)n(Σu)n′ < 0.
(iii) The same hump-shaped effect on the correlation between the returns of assets n and n′ if
(Σu)n(Σu)n′Σnn − (Σu)2nΣnn′
f(wt) [f(wt)u⊤Σu+ 2] (Σu)2n +Σnn
+
(Σu)n(Σu)n′Σn′n′ − (Σu)2n′Σnn′
f(wt) [f(wt)u⊤Σu+ 2] (Σu)2n′ +Σn′n′
> 0, (47)
and the opposite, that is, inverse hump-shaped, effect if (47) holds in the opposite direction.
The effect on correlations is more complicated than that on covariances because it includes
the effect on volatilities. Suppose that changes in arbitrageur wealth move the prices of assets n
and n′ in the same direction, and hence have a hump-shaped effect on their covariance. Because,
however, the effect on volatilities, which are in the denominator, is also hump-shaped, the overall
effect on the correlation can be inverse hump-shaped. Intuitively, arbitrageurs can cause assets to
become less correlated because the increase in volatilities that they cause can swamp the increase
in covariance.
A hump-shaped pattern is possible for expected excess returns as well. This is more surprising
because Corollary 1 shows that an increase in arbitrageur wealth wt lowers the market prices of the
Brownian risks, which are equal to expected excess returns per unit of risk exposure. Offsetting
this effect, is that for wt to the left of the volatility hump, an increase in wt raises volatility because
it raises endogenous risk. The latter effect can dominate and cause expected excess returns to
increase with wt for small values of wt. Proposition 9 shows that when hedgers are short-lived, the
latter effect always dominates for γ < K, and can dominate for larger values of γ as well provided
that the parameter z is sufficiently large.
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PROPOSITION 9: Suppose that hedgers are short-lived. For small arbitrageur wealth wt, an in-
crease in wt raises the expected excess return of each asset in absolute value, if γ < K. If γ > K,







Figure 2 plots the Sharpe ratios, expected excess returns, volatilities and correlations of long-
maturity assets as a function of arbitrageur wealth for long-lived hedgers and for γ = 0.5 and
2. Consistent with Propositions 8 and 9, shown for short-lived hedgers, volatility and correlation
are hump-shaped in arbitrageur wealth, and the hump-shape carries through to expected excess
returns. The comparison across the two values of γ is also interesting. As one would expect, Sharpe
ratios increase in γ. Expected excess returns, however, can be larger for the smaller value of γ. This
is because when arbitrageurs are less risk-averse, they establish larger positions, and this generates
more endogenous risk. As in Proposition 9, the effect of larger endogenous risk on expected excess
returns can dominate that of smaller Sharpe ratios.
IV. Liquidity Risk
In this section we explore the implications of our model for liquidity risk. We assume long-
maturity assets, as in the previous section, and define liquidity based on the impact that hedgers
have on prices. Consider an increase in the parameter un that characterizes hedgers’ willingness to
sell asset n. This triggers a decrease ∂Xnt∂un in the quantity of the asset held by the hedgers, and a
decrease ∂Snt∂un in the asset price. Asset n has low liquidity if the price change per unit of quantity







Defining illiquidity as price impact follows Kyle (1985). Kyle and Xiong (2001), Xiong (2001), and
Johnson (2008) perform similar constructions to ours in asset-pricing settings by defining illiquidity
as the derivative of price with respect to supply.
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Figure 2: Assets’ Sharpe ratios, expected excess returns, volatilities, and correlations
as a function of arbitrageur wealth wt. The plots assume two symmetric and uncorre-
lated risky assets, and set
√
u⊤Σu = 15%, α = 2, ρ = 4% and r = 2%. In the baseline
case, represented by the blue solid line, γ is set to 0.5. The plots examine the effect of
raising γ to 2. The baseline case is identical to that in Figure 1, which also examines
the effect of raising γ to 2 (on dynamic risk aversion and positions).









It converges to infinity when arbitrageur wealth wt goes to zero, and to zero when wt goes to
infinity. When hedgers are short-lived, illiquidity is positive for all wt ∈ (0,∞). When, in addition,
arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility (γ = 1), illiquidity decreases in wt.
Proposition 10 identifies a time-series and a cross-sectional dimension of illiquidity. In the
time-series, illiquidity varies in response to changes in arbitrageur wealth. Our numerical solutions
indicate that illiquidity is a positive and decreasing function of wealth, a finding that Proposition
33
10 confirms in the case where hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility. The
time-series variation of illiquidity is common across assets and corresponds to the term multiplying
Σnn in (49). In the cross-section, illiquidity is higher for assets with more volatile cashflows. The
dependence of illiquidity on an asset n is through Σnn, the asset’s cashflow variance. The time-
series and cross-sectional dimensions of illiquidity interact: assets with more volatile cashflows have
higher illiquidity for any given level of wealth, and the time-variation of their illiquidity is more
pronounced.
We next compute the covariance between asset returns and aggregate illiquidity. Since illiquidity
varies over time because of arbitrageur wealth, and with an inverse relationship, the covariance of
the return vector with illiquidity is equal to the covariance with wealth times a negative coefficient.
Proposition 7 implies, in turn, that the covariance of the return vector with wealth is proportional
to Σu. This is the covariance between asset cashflows and the cashflows of the portfolio u, which
characterizes hedgers’ supply. The intuition for the proportionality is that when arbitrageurs realize
losses, they sell a fraction of u, and this lowers asset prices according to the covariance with u.







where CΛ(wt) is a negative coefficient. Assets that suffer the most when aggregate illiquidity
increases and arbitrageurs sell a fraction of the portfolio u, are those corresponding to large com-
ponents (Σu)n of Σu. They have volatile cashflows (high Σnn), or are in high supply by hedgers
(high un), or correlate highly with assets with those characteristics.
Using Proposition 10, we can compute two additional liquidity-related covariances: the covari-
ance between an asset’s illiquidity and aggregate illiquidity, and the covariance between an asset’s
illiquidity and aggregate return. We take the aggregate return to be that of the portfolio u, which
characterizes hedgers’ supply. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show theoretically, within a model
with exogenous transaction costs, that both covariances are linked to expected returns in the cross-
section. In our model, the time-variation of the illiquidity of an asset n is proportional to the asset’s
cashflow variance Σnn. Therefore, the covariances between the asset’s illiquidity on one hand, and
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aggregate illiquidity or return on the other, are proportional to Σnn.
COROLLARY 3: In the cross-section of assets:
(i) The covariance between asset n’s return dRnt and aggregate illiquidity Λt is proportional to
the covariance (Σu)n between the asset’s cashflows and the cashflows of the hedger-supplied
portfolio u.
(ii) The covariance between asset n’s illiquidity λnt and aggregate illiquidity Λt is proportional to
the variance Σnn of the asset’s cashflows.
(iii) The covariance between asset n’s illiquidity λnt and aggregate return u
⊤dRt is proportional
to the variance Σnn of the asset’s cashflows.
When hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic utility (γ = 1), the proportionality
coefficient CΛ(wt) in the first relationship is negative, and those in the second and third relationships
are positive and negative, respectively.
We next determine the link between liquidity-related covariances and expected returns. Equa-
tion (44) shows that the expected excess return of an asset n is proportional to (Σu)n. This is
exactly proportional to the covariance between the asset’s return and aggregate illiquidity. Thus,
aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor that explains expected returns perfectly. Intuitively,
assets are priced by the portfolio of arbitrageurs, who are the marginal agents. Moreover, the
covariance between asset returns and aggregate illiquidity identifies that portfolio perfectly. This is
because (i) changes in aggregate illiquidity are driven by arbitrageur wealth, and (ii) the portfolio
of trades that arbitrageurs perform when their wealth changes is proportional to their existing
portfolio and impacts returns proportionately to the covariance with that portfolio.
The covariances between an asset’s illiquidity on one hand, and aggregate illiquidity or returns
on the other, are less informative about expected returns. Indeed, these covariances are proportional
to cashflow variance Σnn, which is only a component of (Σu)n. Thus, these covariances proxy for
the true priced risk factor but imperfectly so.
COROLLARY 4: In the cross-section of assets, expected excess returns are proportional to the co-
variance between returns and aggregate illiquidity. When hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs
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have logarithmic utility (γ = 1), the proportionality coefficient ΠΛ(wt) in this relationship is nega-
tive.
The premium associated to the illiquidity risk factor is the expected excess return per unit of
covariance with the factor. Hence, it coincides with the proportionality coefficient ΠΛ(wt) in the
relationship between expected excess returns and covariance of returns with aggregate illiquidity.
Both the premium of the illiquidity risk factor and the covariance of returns with aggregate
illiquidity vary over time in response to changes in arbitrageur wealth wt. When wt is low, illiquidity
is high and highly sensitive to changes in wealth. Because of that effect, assets’ covariance with
illiquidity is large in absolute value when wt is small, and decreases when wt increases. Conversely,
because the premium of the illiquidity risk factor is the expected excess return per unit of covariance,
it is small in absolute value when wt is small and increases when wt increases.
13
PROPOSITION 11: The common component CΛ(wt) of assets’ covariance with aggregate illiquid-
ity, and the premium ΠΛ(wt) of the illiquidity risk factor have the following properties:
• CΛ(wt) converges to minus infinity when arbitrageur wealth wt goes to zero, and to zero when
wt goes to infinity.
• ΠΛ(wt) converges to zero when wt goes to zero. When hedgers are short-lived, ΠΛ(wt) con-
verges to minus infinity when wt goes to infinity.
Aggregate illiquidity explains expected returns perfectly in our model because it is a monotone
function of arbitrageur wealth wt. Hence, any other monotone function of wt would also have this
property. Recent empirical papers on intermediary asset pricing, such as Adrian, Etula, and Muir
(2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), have used the leverage of specific groups of financial
intermediaries as a risk factor, and have shown that it can price a large cross-section of assets. The
findings of these papers are exactly consistent with our model, insofar as leverage is a monotone
function of wt.
14 Our modelling approach suggests that these findings may be explained even with
minimal frictions, for example, no borrowing constraints. On the other hand, introducing frictions
may give better guidance on which function of wt to use as a risk factor.
13Since the premium of the illiquidity risk factor depends on wt, it can be viewed as a function of illiquidity itself,
which is a monotone decreasing function of wt.
14A natural measure of leverage in our model is the total risk exposure of arbitrageurs as a fraction of their wealth.
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V. Positive Supply
Our analysis so far assumes that the long-maturity assets are in zero supply (s = 0). Proposition
12 shows that this assumption is without loss of generality when hedgers are long-lived: risk-sharing
and asset prices are the same as when assets are in zero supply, provided that we replace u by s+u.
The intuition is that the stream of random endowments u⊤dDt that a long-lived hedger receives
over time is equivalent to an endowment of u shares in the long-maturity assets. Thus, hedgers
generate a supply u, which is added to the supply s coming from the asset issuers. If instead asset
issuers generate no supply and hedgers generate s+u, then hedgers reduce their demand by s. Since
the reduction in hedgers’ demand exactly offsets the reduction in asset issuers’ supply, equilibrium
prices remain the same and so does risk-sharing.
PROPOSITION 12: Suppose that hedgers are long-lived and long-maturity assets are in positive
supply s. If (St, Xt, Yt) is an equilibrium, then (St, Xt − s, Yt) is an equilibrium when assets are
in zero supply (s = 0) and u is replaced by s + u. In both equilibria, the exposures of hedgers and
arbitrageurs to the Brownian shocks and the prices of the assets are the same.
When hedgers are short-lived, the equivalence between positive-supply and zero-supply equilib-
ria does not hold. This is because any given short-lived hedger receives a random endowment only
in the next instant, so that endowment is not equivalent to one in the long-maturity assets. Prices
and expected returns, however, have the same general form as with zero supply.
PROPOSITION 13: Suppose that hedgers are short-lived and that long-maturity assets are in pos-





αwt +A(wt)wt − F ′(wt)wt
.
Lemma IA8, stated and proven in the Internet Appendix, shows that this measure of leverage is decreasing in wt
when hedgers are short-lived and γ ≤ 1. Our numerical solutions suggest that this result holds more generally. A
countercyclical leverage is consistent with the empirical finding of He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), and the theory of
He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), but is inconsistent with Adrian, Etula, and
Muir (2014).
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+ g(wt)Σ(s+ u), (51)















The price of an asset n, given in (51), is the sum of the price D̄nr that would arise if arbitrageurs
had infinite wealth, and of a discount that is proportional to the asset’s covariance (Σ(s+u))n with
aggregate supply s + u. Changes in arbitrageur wealth affect the discount, and hence their effect
is proportional to the covariance. Since the asset’s expected return, given in (52), is proportional
to the same covariance, aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor and explains expected returns
perfectly, as in the case of zero supply. The equivalence between positive and zero supply does
not hold for short-lived hedgers because the proportionality coefficients (e.g., the function g(wt))
depend on both s and u rather than only on their sum.
VI. Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model of liquidity provision, in which hedgers can trade multiple risky
assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have CRRA utility over consumption, and their capital
matters because of wealth effects. We strip out frictions such as asymmetric information and
borrowing constraints. At the same time, we depart from most frictionless asset-pricing models
by fixing the riskless rate and by suppressing wealth effects for the arbitrageurs’ counterparties.
Under this combination of assumptions, we prove general analytical results on equilibrium prices
and allocations. We characterize, in particular, how arbitrageurs’ risk aversion, the endogenous
risk that they generate, and the pricing of that risk, depend on arbitrageur wealth and hedger
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characteristics. We also show that arbitrageur wealth is the single priced risk factor, and that
aggregate illiquidity, which declines in wealth, captures that factor.
One important extension of our model is to allow the supply u coming from hedgers to be
time-varying and stochastic. Such an extension would give our measure of illiquidity (48) stronger
empirical content because that measure is based on supply shocks. We could also compare our
measure to measures commonly used in empirical work, for example, Amihud (2002) and Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), and identify their properties when volume arises both because of supply shocks
affecting liquidity demanders and wealth effects affecting liquidity providers. In a similar spirit,
supply shocks may generate a tighter relationship between volatility and our measure of illiquidity.
Indeed, volatility in our model is driven by wealth effects of arbitrageurs and is hump-shaped in
wealth, while illiquidity is defined based on supply shocks affecting hedgers and is decreasing in
wealth.
Extending our model to stochastic u could strengthen our interpretation of arbitrageurs as
specialized liquidity providers. Indeed, a common view of liquidity providers (e.g., Grossman and
Miller (1988)) is that they absorb temporary imbalances between demand and supply. A natural
interpretation of these imbalances within our model is as shocks to u. In the presence of these
shocks, liquidity provision becomes distinct from sharing the aggregate risk in the economy, which
also includes the supply s coming from issuers. To model this idea, we would need to introduce
additional agents to the model who absorb part of s but are unable to identify shocks to u or trade
on them. Under such an extension, the result of Section V that s and u are symmetric in terms
of their effects on prices and expected returns would break down. Arbitrageur wealth or variables
related to it, such as illiquidity, may remain the single priced risk factor, however.
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Internet Appendix to
“Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital”
PÉTER KONDOR and DIMITRI VAYANOS 1
Section I proves the results stated in Section II of the main article. Section II proves the results
stated in Section III of the main article. Section III proves the results stated in Sections IV and V
of the main article.
I. Proofs of the Results in Section II of the Main Article



















where u(c̄t) = e
−α
r
c̄t , (µvt, σvt) are the drift and diffusion of the hedger’s wealth vt, and (µwt, σwt)
are the drift and diffusion of arbitrageur wealth. Substituting dDt from (1) into (8) and (13), we
find that the drifts and diffusions are
µvt = rvt − c̄t + x⊤t (D̄ − πt) + u⊤D̄, (IA2)
σvt = σ(xt + u), (IA3)
for the hedger, and
µwt = rwt − ct + y⊤t (D̄ − πt), (IA4)
σwt = σyt, (IA5)
for arbitrageurs.
1Citation format: Kondor, Peter, and Dimitri Vayanos, Internet Appendix to “Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics
of Arbitrage Capital,” Journal of Finance [DOI STRING]. Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the
content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing
material) should be directed to the authors of the article.
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Substituting (9) and (IA2)-(IA5) into (IA1), we can write the latter equation as






c̄t + αe−[αvt+F (wt)]
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α2e−[αvt+F (wt)](xt + u)










F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]
e−[αvt+F (wt)]y⊤t Σyt − αF ′(wt)e−[αvt+F (wt)](xt + u)⊤Σyt
}
. (IA6)
The first-order conditions with respect to c̄t and xt yield (10) and (11), respectively.










where µvt is given by (IA2) with c̄t = 0, and σvt is given by (IA3). Using (IA2) and (IA3), we find











The first-order condition with respect to xt yields (12).





















1−γ for γ ̸= 1 and u(ĉt) = log(ĉt) for γ = 1, (µŵt, σŵt) are the drift and diffusion of
the arbitrageur’s own wealth ŵt, and (µwt, σwt) are the drift and diffusion of the arbitrageurs’ ag-
gregate wealth. The quantities (µwt, σwt) are given by (IA4) and (IA5), respectively. The quantities
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(µŵt, σŵt) are given by the counterparts of these equations with hat signs, that is,
µŵt = rŵt − ĉt + ŷ⊤t (D̄ − πt), (IA10)
σŵt = σŷt. (IA11)










































The first-order conditions with respect to ĉt and ŷt yield (16) and (17), respectively. When γ = 1,































The first-order conditions with respect to ĉt and ŷt yield (16) and (17), respectively, for q(wt) =
1
ρ .









When γ ̸= 1, we substitute (16), (22), (23), (IA14), and (IA15) into the arbitrageur’s Bellman
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where the second step follows again from (19). Substituting (IA18) into (IA17), we find















Rearranging (IA19) and using the definition of z in (25), we find the ODE (26).





. The ODE (26) holds for these values. The arbitrageur’s
Bellman equation (IA13) yields an ODE involving q1(wt). To derive it we substitute (16), (22),
(23), (IA14), (IA15), q(wt) =
1
ρ and A(wt) =
1
wt
into (IA13). The terms in ŵt cancel, and the
4
resulting equation is





)rwt − ρwt + α2u⊤Σu 1wt[













α+ 1wt − F
′(wt)
]2 . (IA20)





c̄t + αe−[αvt+F (wt)]
[
rvt − c̄t + x⊤t (D̄ − πt) + u⊤D̄
]
= −re−[αvt+F (wt)] + αe−[αvt+F (wt)]
[ r
α
[log(r)− F (wt)] + u⊤D̄ + αx⊤t Σ(xt + u) + F ′(wt)x⊤t Σyt
]
.
Substituting into (IA6), we can write that equation as
ρ̄ =r + rF (wt)− r log(r)− αu⊤D̄ −
1
2
α2(xt − u)⊤Σ(xt + u)− F ′(wt)
[





F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]

















F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]















F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]
y⊤t Σyt + αF
′(wt)u
⊤Σyt
= −F ′(wt)(rwt − ct)−
α2u⊤Σu







+ 2F ′(wt)A(wt) + F




= −F ′(wt)(rwt − ct)−
α2u⊤Σu {F ′′(wt)−A(wt) [2α+A(wt)− 2F ′(wt)]}
2 [α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)]2
,
where the first step follows from (18), the second from (20), and the third from (23). Substituting
into (IA21) and simplifying, we find
ρ̄ =r + rF (wt)− r log(r)− αu⊤D̄ − F ′(wt)(rwt − ct)
− α
2u⊤Σu {F ′′(wt)−A(wt) [2α+A(wt)− 2F ′(wt)]}
2 [α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)]2
. (IA22)
Substituting ct from (IA14) and rearranging, we find (27).
Proof of Theorem 1: We start with the case where hedgers are short-lived. The second-order ODE





















































is continuously differentiable for (w,Q,R) ∈ (0,∞) × (−∞,∞) × (−∞,∞), it is locally Lipschitz
in that set. Hence, for any ϵ > 0, the system of (IA25) and (IA26) has a unique solution in a
neighborhood of ϵ with initial conditions Q(ϵ) > 0 and R(ϵ) > 0. We can extend that solution
maximally to the left and to the right of ϵ, over an interval I. That solution satisfies Q(wt) > 0 for
all wt ∈ I because of (IA25). We next derive properties of solutions to the system of (IA25) and
(IA26), as well as the existence result, through a number of lemmas.
LEMMA IA1 (Limits at zero and infinity): Consider a solution Q(wt) > 0 and R(wt) to the system
of (IA25) and (IA26), defined over the interval (0,∞).
• If limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞), then this limit is equal to K if γ < K and to γ if γ > K. In the
former case limwt→0Q(wt) = 0 and in the latter case limwt→0Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞).
• If limwt→∞Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞), then this limit is equal to r +
ρ−r
γ , and limwt→∞R(wt) = γ.
Proof: To derive the limits at zero, we start by observing that the finiteness of limwt→0R(wt)
implies that if limwt→0R
′(wt)wt exists then it must be zero. Indeed, if limwt→0R
′(wt)wt ̸= 0, then
|R′(wt)| ≥ ℓwt for wt < ϵ and for positive ϵ and ℓ. Since, however, for wt < ϵ
R(wt) = R(ϵ) +
∫ wt
ϵ











limwt→0R(wt) would be plus or minus infinity, a contradiction.
If limwt→0R(wt) < γ, then (IA25) implies limwt→0Q(wt) = ∞. The latter equation, to-
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gether with (IA26) and limwt→0R(wt) ̸= 0, imply limwt→0R′(wt)wt = ∞, a contradiction. If













′(wt)wt = 0 in (IA27), and using limwt→0R(wt) ̸= 0, we find G (limwt→0R(wt)) =
0. Since the quadratic polynomialG(γ) defined in (28) has the unique positive rootK, limwt→0R(wt) =
K. Suppose, finally, that limwt→0R(wt) = γ and limwt→0R
′(wt)wt exists. Setting limwt→0R
′(wt)wt =
0 in (IA26), we find

















Since K is the unique positive root of G(γ) and the quadratic term of G(γ) is negative, (IA28) has
a positive solution for limwt→0Q(wt) if γ > K.
If γ > K, then the case limwt→0R(wt) > γ is not possible because it would imply limwt→0R(wt) =
K < γ. Hence, limwt→0R(wt) = γ and limwt→0Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞). If γ < K, then the case
limwt→0R(wt) = γ is not possible because it would imply limwt→0Q(wt) < 0. Hence, limwt→0R(wt) =
K and limwt→0Q(wt) = 0.
To complete the proof for the limits at zero, we need to show that in the case limwt→0R(wt) =
γ, limwt→0R
′(wt)wt exists. From (IA26), this is equivalent to showing that limwt→0Q(wt) ex-
ists. We proceed by contradiction and assume that limwt→0Q(wt) does not exist, and hence
lim supwt→0Q(wt) > lim infwt→0Q(wt). This means that as wt goes to zero Q(wt) oscillates more
and more rapidly between maxima and minima whose distance is bounded away from zero. Differ-
8




























where the second step follows from R(wt) = γ, which holds at a maximizer and a minimizer of
Q(wt) because of (IA25), and the third step follows from (IA26). Since Q
′′(wt) < 0 at a maximizer,
(IA29) implies









Taking the limit along a sequence of maximizers as wt goes to zero, we find









Since Q′′(wt) > 0 at a minimizer, (IA29) likewise implies that









Equations (IA30) and (IA31) imply that lim supwt→0Q(wt) ≤ lim infwt→0Q(wt), a contradiction.
Consider next the limits at infinity. If limwt→∞R(wt) exists, then it has to equal γ, otherwise
(IA25) would imply that limwt→∞Q(wt) is either zero or infinity. Moreover,
limwt→∞Q(wt)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 = 0 ⇒ lim
wt→∞




otherwise (IA26) would imply that limwt→0R
′(wt) is plus or minus infinity, which contradicts the
finiteness of limwt→0R(wt).
To complete the proof for the limits at infinity, we need to show that limwt→∞R(wt) ex-
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ists. We proceed by contradiction and assume that limwt→∞R(wt) does not exist, and hence
lim supwt→∞R(wt) > lim infwt→∞R(wt). SinceR(wt) oscillates between values close to lim supwt→∞R(wt)
and values close to lim infwt→∞R(wt), there exists ξ ∈ (lim infwt→∞R(wt), lim supwt→∞R(wt)) and
a sequence {wtn}n∈N converging to infinity such that R(wtn) = ξ and R′(wtn) alternates between
being non-positive and non-negative. Equation (IA26) implies, however, that for large n, the sign




which does not change and can be chosen to be non-zero by varying ξ, a contradiction.
LEMMA IA2 (Single crossing of solutions): Consider two solutions (Q1(wt), R1(wt)) and
(Q2(wt), R2(wt)) to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with initial conditions Q1(ϵ) > Q2(ϵ) > 0
and R1(ϵ) = R2(ϵ) > 0 for ϵ > 0. The solutions compare as follows:
• Q1(wt) > Q2(wt) for all wt for which the solutions are defined.
• R1(wt) > R2(wt) for all wt > ϵ, and R1(wt) < R2(wt) for all wt < ϵ.
Proof: We first show the inequalities for wt > ϵ. Since Q1(ϵ) > Q2(ϵ) > 0, (IA26) implies
R′1(ϵ) > R
′
2(ϵ). Since, in addition, R1(ϵ) = R2(ϵ), R1(wt) > R2(wt) for wt close to and larger than
ϵ. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that there exists wt > ϵ such that Q1(wt) ≤ Q2(wt) or
R1(wt) ≤ R2(wt). The infimum m within that set is strictly larger than ϵ since Q1(wt) > Q2(wt)
and R1(wt) > R2(wt) for wt close to and larger than ϵ. Since the same inequalities hold for all
wt ∈ (ϵ,m), Q1(m) ≥ Q2(m) and R1(m) ≥ R2(m), with one of these inequalities being an equality.












Since R1(wt) > R2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), (IA32) implies Q1(m) > Q2(m). Hence, R1(m) must
be equal to R2(m). Since R1(wt) > R2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), R′1(m) ≤ R′2(m). Equation (IA26)
then implies Q1(m) ≤ Q2(m), a contradiction.




R′2(ϵ), R1(wt) < R2(wt) for wt close to and smaller than ϵ. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose
that there exists wt < ϵ such that Q1(wt) ≤ Q2(wt) or R1(wt) ≥ R2(wt). The supremum m within
that set is strictly smaller than ϵ since Q1(wt) > Q2(wt) and R1(wt) < R2(wt) for wt close to and
smaller than ϵ. Since the same inequalities hold for all wt ∈ (m, ϵ), Q1(m) ≥ Q2(m) and R1(m) ≤
R2(m), with one of these inequalities being an equality. Since R1(wt) < R2(wt) for all wt ∈ (m, ϵ),
(IA32) implies Q1(m) > Q2(m). Hence, R1(m) must be equal to R2(m). Since R1(wt) < R2(wt) for
all wt ∈ (m, ϵ), R′1(m) ≤ R′2(m). Equation (IA26) then implies Q1(m) ≤ Q2(m), a contradiction.
LEMMA IA3 (Existence in finite interval): For any ϵ > 0 and M > ϵ large enough, there exists a
unique solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) that is defined over an interval including [ϵ,M ]
and that satisfies R(ϵ) = max{γ,K}, R(M) = γ and Q(ϵ) > 0.
Proof: We will consider solutions to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with R(ϵ) = max{γ,K}, and
show that by varying Q(ϵ) we can vary R(M) from negative values to large positive values. We
will then use a continuity argument to find a suitable Q(ϵ), and the single-crossing argument in
Lemma IA2 to show that such a Q(ϵ) is unique.
Consider the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with initial conditions R(ϵ) =
max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = 0, and extend it maximally to the right of ϵ, over an interval I. Since
Q(ϵ) = 0, (IA25) implies Q(wt) = 0 for all wt ∈ I. Equation (IA25) implies that R′(ϵ) has the
same sign as
















= max{γ,K}G (max{γ,K}) . (IA33)
If γ ≤ K, then (IA33) is equal to zero because K is a root of G(γ), as implied by (28). If γ > K,
then (IA33) is negative because K is the unique positive root of G(γ) and the quadratic term of
G(γ) is negative. In both cases, R′(ϵ) < 0 and hence R(wt) < max{γ,K} for wt close to and larger
than ϵ.
We next show that R(wt) must lie between max{γ,K} and the unique negative root of G(γ),
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which we denote by K ′. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that there exists wt > ϵ such that
R(wt) > max{γ,K}. The infimum m within that set is strictly larger than ϵ since R(wt) <
max{γ,K} for wt close to and larger than ϵ. Since R(wt) < max{γ,K} for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m),











which is negative from the previous argument, a contradiction. Hence, R(wt) ≤ {γ,K} for all
wt ∈ I. To show that R(wt) ≥ K ′ for all wt ∈ I, we similarly proceed by contradiction and
suppose that there exists wt > ϵ such that R(wt) < K
′. The infimum m within that set is strictly
larger than ϵ, and satisfies R(m) = K ′ and R′(m) ≤ 0. Equation (IA25), however, implies that






























where the second step follows because G(K ′) = 0 implies rK
′
ρ−r + 1 =
z(K′−1)
K′ > 0, and the fourth
step follows from K ′ being a root of G(γ). Hence R′(m) > 0, a contradiction.
Since R(wt) lies within a bounded interval, the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with
initial conditions R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = 0 can be extended to infinity, that is, I = [ϵ,∞).
Since, R(wt) is bounded and Q(wt) = 0 for all wt ∈ I,
r limwt→∞R(wt)
ρ− r






otherwise (IA26) would imply that limwt→∞R
′(wt) is plus or minus infinity, which contradicts the
boundedness of R(wt).
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Consider next the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with initial conditions R(ϵ) =
max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = r + (1+z)(ρ−r)max{γ,K} , and extend it maximally to the right of ϵ, over an interval
I. Equation (IA25) implies that R′(ϵ) has the same sign as








= max{γ,K} (1−max{γ,K}) + (αw +max{γ,K})2
> max{γ,K} (1−max{γ,K}) + (max{γ,K})2 = max{γ,K} > 0, (IA34)
where the second step follows from the definition of Q(ϵ). Hence, R′(ϵ) > 0. We next show that
R′(wt) > 0 for all wt ∈ I. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that there exists wt > ϵ such
that R′(wt) ≤ 0. The infimum m within that set is strictly larger than ϵ, and satisfies R′(m) = 0.
Since R′(wt) > 0 for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), R(wt) > max{γ,K} and hence (IA25) implies Q(m) > Q(ϵ).

























> R(m)[1−R(m)] + [αm+R(m)]2
> R(m)[1−R(m)] +R(m)2 = R(m) > 0, (IA35)
where the second step follows from Q(m) > Q(ϵ), the third step from the definition of Q(ϵ), and
the fourth step from R(m) > max{γ,K}. Hence, R′(m) > 0, a contradiction. Since R′(wt) > 0
for all wt ∈ I, R(wt) increases to a limit, which must be infinite. Indeed, if the limit were
finite, limwt→∞R
′(wt) = 0, in which case (IA26) would imply limwt→∞Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞). This is a
contradiction: because limwt→∞R(wt) > γ, (IA25) implies limwt→∞Q(wt) = ∞. Note that R(wt)
can reach its infinite limit when wt goes to a finite value m, in which case the interval I is bounded.
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We denote by Γ(Q) the value of R(M) for the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26)
with initial conditions R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = Q. If limwt→mR(wt) = ∞ for m ≤ M , then
we set R(M) = ∞. For large enough M , the function Γ(Q) satisfies Γ(0) < 0 because for the
solution with initial conditions R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = 0, limwt→∞R(wt) =
r−ρ
r < 0. The




> γ because for the solution with initial conditions
R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = r + (1+z)(ρ−r)max{γ,K} , limwt→mR(wt) = ∞, where m > ϵ is the upper end
of the interval I. Lemma IA2 implies that for Q1 > Q2, Γ(Q1) > Γ(Q2) if Γ(Q2) is finite, and
Γ(Q1) = ∞ if Γ(Q2) = ∞. Continuity of the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) with
respect to the initial conditions implies that Γ(Q) is continuous in Q at any point where Γ(Q) is
finite. Hence, Γ(Q) is finite in an interval [0, Q̄) and is infinite in [Q̄,∞). Moreover, it is continuous
an increasing in Q ∈ [0, Q̄), and satisfies limQ→Q̄ Γ(Q) = ∞. Therefore, for large enough M , there
exists a unique Q̂ ∈ [0, Q̄) such that Γ(Q̂) = γ. The solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26)
with initial conditions R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} and Q(ϵ) = Q̂ has the properties in the lemma.
LEMMA IA4 (Bounds): For any ϵ > 0 and M > ϵ large enough, the solution to the system of
(IA25) and (IA26) constructed in Lemma IA3 satisfies the following inequalities:
• If γ < 1, then 1 > R(wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M).
• If γ > 1, then 1 < R(wt) < γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M).
Proof: Consider first the case γ < 1. To show that R(wt) < 1 for all wt ∈ [ϵ,M ], we proceed by
contradiction and assume that there exists wt ∈ (ϵ,M) such that R(wt) ≥ 1. In that case, R(wt)
reaches its maximum value over the closed interval [ϵ,M ] at an interior point m, and R(m) ≥ 1.













































where the second step follows from (IA25). The first term in (IA37) is non-negative because of
(IA36). The second term is positive because R(m) ≥ 1 > γ. Hence, R′′(m) > 0, which contradicts
m being an interior maximizer of R(wt).
To show that R(wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M), we proceed by contradiction and assume that there
exists wt ∈ (ϵ,M) such that R(wt) ≤ γ. In that case, R(wt) takes its minimum value over the closed
interval [ϵ,M ] at an interior pointm (and possibly at ϵ andM as well), and R(m) ≤ γ. Suppose first
that R(m) = γ. Proceeding as in (IA36) we find Q(m)−rρ−r R(m)− 1 < 0, and proceeding as in (IA37)
we find R′′(m) < 0, which contradicts m being an interior minimizer of R(wt). Suppose next that
R(m) < γ. Since R(ϵ) ≥ γ and R(M) = γ, there exist (wt, ŵt) such that ϵ ≤ wt < m < ŵt ≤ M
and R(wt) = R(ŵt) = γ. The supremum m1 and the infimum m2 within the corresponding sets
satisfy m1 < m < m2, R(m1) = R(m2) = γ, R(wt) < γ for all wt ∈ (m1,m2), R′(m1) ≤ 0 and
R′(m2) ≥ 0. Using (IA26) and R(m1) = R(m2) = γ, we find that the inequalities R′(m1) ≤ 0 and
R′(m2) ≥ 0 imply








≤ 0 ⇒ Q(m1)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 ≤ zγ(γ − 1)
(αm1 + γ)2
, (IA38)








≥ 0 ⇒ Q(m2)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 ≥ zγ(γ − 1)
(αm2 + γ)2
, (IA39)
respectively. Since γ < 1, (IA38) and (IA39) imply Q(m1) < Q(m2). This is a contradiction
because (IA26) and R(wt) < γ for all wt ∈ (m1,m2) imply Q(m1) > Q(m2).
The inequalities in the case γ > 1 follow from similar arguments. Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists wt ∈ (ϵ,M) such that R(wt) ≥ γ. In that case, R(wt) reaches its maximum
value over the closed interval [ϵ,M ] at an interior point m (and possibly at ϵ and M as well), and
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R(m) ≥ γ. Proceeding as in (IA36) we find Q(m)−rρ−r R(m)− 1 > 0, and proceeding as in (IA37) we
find R′′(m) > 0, which contradicts m being an interior maximizer of R(wt).
Suppose next, by contradiction, that there exists wt ∈ (ϵ,M) such that R(wt) ≤ 1. In that
case, R(wt) reaches its minimum value over the closed interval [ϵ,M ] at an interior point m, and
R(m) ≤ 1. Suppose first that R(m) = 1. Proceeding as in (IA36) we find Q(m)−rρ−r R(m) − 1 = 0,
and proceeding as in (IA37) we find R′′(m) < 0, which contradicts m being an interior minimizer
of R(wt). Suppose next that R(m) < 1. Since R(ϵ) = R(M) = γ > 1, there exist (wt, ŵt) such that
ϵ < wt < m < ŵt < M and R(wt) = R(ŵt) = 1. The supremum m1 and the infimum m2 within the
corresponding sets satisfy m1 < m < m2, R(m1) = R(m2) = 1, R(wt) < 1 for all wt ∈ (m1,m2),
R′(m1) ≤ 0 and R′(m2) ≥ 0. Using (IA26) and R(m1) = R(m2) = 1, we find that the inequalities
R′(m1) ≤ 0 and R′(m2) ≥ 0 imply
Q(m1)− r
ρ− r
− 1 ≤ 0, (IA40)
Q(m2)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 ≥ 0, (IA41)
respectively, and hence Q(m1) ≤ Q(m2). This is a contradiction because (IA26) and R(wt) < 1 < γ
for all wt ∈ (m1,m2) imply Q(m1) > Q(m2).
LEMMA IA5 (Existence in [0,∞]): A solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26), defined over
the interval (0,∞), and such that limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞) and limwt→∞Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞), exists.
This solution satisfies the inequalities in Lemma IA4 for all wt ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: We will construct the solution over (0,∞) as the simple limit of solutions over finite intervals
[ϵ,M ]. We first derive the limit when M goes to infinity, holding ϵ > 0 constant, and then derive
the limit of those limits when ϵ goes to zero.
Fix ϵ > 0 and denote by (Qϵ,M (wt), Rϵ,M (wt)) the solution constructed in Lemma IA3 for
M > ϵ large enough. Consider first the case γ < 1. Since for M2 > M1, Rϵ,M2(M1) > γ (as
implied by Lemma IA4) and Rϵ,M1(M1) = γ, Lemma IA2 implies Qϵ,M2(ϵ) > Qϵ,M1(ϵ), and hence
Qϵ,M2(wt) > Qϵ,M1(wt) and Rϵ,M2(wt) > Rϵ,M1(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M1]. This means that the
functions M → Qϵ,M (wt) and M → Rϵ,M (wt), defined for given wt > ϵ and for M > wt, are
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increasing. The latter function is bounded above by one (as implied by Lemma IA4). The former
function is also bounded above. Indeed, since Rϵ,M (M) = γ and R
′
ϵ,M (M) ≤ 0 (which follows from
Rϵ,M (M) = γ and Rϵ,M (wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M)), (IA26) implies
Qϵ,M (M)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 ≤ zγ(γ − 1)
(αM + γ)2




Since, in addition, Qϵ,M (wt) is increasing in wt ∈ (ϵ,M) (which follows from (IA25) and because
Rϵ,M (wt) > γ), Qϵ,M (wt) < r +
ρ−r
γ for all wt < M . Being increasing and bounded above, the
functions M → Qϵ,M (wt) and M → Rϵ,M (wt) converge to limits when M goes to infinity. These
limits, denoted by Qϵ(wt) and Rϵ(wt), respectively, satisfy r+
ρ−r
γ ≥ Qϵ(wt) ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ Rϵ(wt) ≥ γ
for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞).
Consider next the case γ < 1. Since for M2 > M1, Rϵ,M2(M1) < γ (as implied by Lemma IA4)
and Rϵ,M1(M1) = γ, Lemma IA2 implies Qϵ,M2(ϵ) < Qϵ,M1(ϵ), and hence Qϵ,M2(wt) < Qϵ,M1(wt)
and Rϵ,M2(wt) < Rϵ,M1(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M1]. This means that the functions M → Qϵ,M (wt)
and M → Rϵ,M (wt) are decreasing. The former function is bounded below by zero and the latter
function is bounded below by one (as implied by Lemma IA4). Hence, the two functions converge





≥ Qϵ(wt) ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ Rϵ(wt) ≤ γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞). The upper bound
on Qϵ(wt) can be derived by noting that since Rϵ,M (ϵ) = γ and R
′
ϵ,M (ϵ) ≤ 0 (which follows from
Rϵ,M (ϵ) = γ and Rϵ,M (wt) < γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M)), (IA26) implies
Qϵ,M (ϵ)− r
ρ− r
γ − 1 ≤ zγ(γ − 1)
(αϵ+ γ)2









Since, in addition, Qϵ,M (wt) is decreasing in wt ∈ (ϵ,M) (which follows from (IA25) and because






for all wt > ϵ.
We next show that the limits Qϵ(wt) and Rϵ(wt), viewed as functions of wt, are solutions to the
system of (IA25) and (IA26). We denote by Q∗ϵ (wt) and R
∗
ϵ (wt) the limits of the functions M →
Q′ϵ,M (wt) and M → R′ϵ,M (wt), respectively. These limits exist because the limits of M → Qϵ,M (wt)
and M → Rϵ,M (wt) exist, and because (Q′ϵ,M (wt), R′ϵ,M (wt)) are linked to (Qϵ,M (wt), Rϵ,M (wt))
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through (IA25) and (IA26). Consider wt ∈ (ϵ,∞) and a small neighborhood B around it. Since
(Qϵ,M (m), Rϵ,M (m)) are bounded uniformly for all m ∈ B and for all M , (IA25) and (IA26) imply
that the same is true for (Q′ϵ,M (m), R
′





can be seen by differentiating (IA25) and (IA26). Denoting the bound on Q′′ϵ,M (m) by Q̄ϵ,B and
using the intermediate value theorem, we find that for all m ∈ B,
∣∣∣∣Qϵ,M (m)−Qϵ,M (wt)m− wt −Q′ϵ,M (wt)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣Q′ϵ,M (m′)−Q′ϵ,M (wt)∣∣ ≤ Q̄ϵ,B|m′ − wt| < Q̄ϵ,B|m− wt|,
(IA42)
where m′ is between m and wt. Taking limits in (IA42) when M goes to infinity, we find
∣∣∣∣Qϵ(m)−Qϵ(wt)m− wt −Q∗ϵ (wt)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Q̄ϵ,B|m− wt|. (IA43)









ϵ (wt). Taking limits in (IA25)
and (IA26), written for (Qϵ,M (wt), Rϵ,M (wt)), whenM goes to infinity, we find that (Qϵ(wt), Rϵ(wt))
are solutions to (IA25) and (IA26).
We next take the limits of Qϵ(wt) and Rϵ(wt) when ϵ goes to zero, and show that these limits,
denoted by Q(wt) and R(wt), respectively, are bounded and solve the system of (IA25) and (IA26).
The steps parallel those when limits are taken for given ϵ and for M going to infinity, but additional
complications arise. Consider first the case K < γ < 1. Since for ϵ2 < ϵ1 and for M large enough,
Rϵ2,M (ϵ1) > γ (as implied by Lemma IA4) and Rϵ1,M (ϵ1) = γ, Lemma IA2 (applied with M
rather than ϵ as starting value) implies Qϵ2,M (M) < Qϵ1,M (M), and hence Qϵ2,M (wt) < Qϵ1,M (wt)
and Rϵ2,M (wt) > Rϵ1,M (wt) for all wt ∈ [ϵ1,M). Taking limits when M goes to infinity, we find
Qϵ2(wt) ≤ Qϵ1(wt) and Rϵ2(wt) ≥ Rϵ1(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ1,∞). Hence, the functions ϵ → Qϵ(wt)
and ϵ → Rϵ(wt), defined for given wt > ϵ, are increasing and decreasing, respectively. Their limits
and bounds are constructed as in the first part of the proof (M goes to infinity).
Consider next the case γ > 1. Since for ϵ2 < ϵ1 and for M large enough, Rϵ2,M (ϵ1) < γ (as
implied by Lemma IA4) and Rϵ1,M (ϵ1) = γ, Lemma IA2 implies Qϵ2,M (M) > Qϵ1,M (M), and hence
Qϵ2,M (wt) > Qϵ1,M (wt) and Rϵ2,M (wt) < Rϵ1,M (wt) for all wt ∈ [ϵ1,M). Taking limits when M
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goes to infinity, we find Qϵ2(wt) ≥ Qϵ1(wt) and Rϵ2(wt) ≤ Rϵ1(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ1,∞). Hence,
the functions ϵ → Qϵ(wt) and ϵ → Rϵ(wt), defined for given wt > ϵ, are decreasing and increasing,
respectively. Their limits and bounds are constructed as in the first part of the proof.
Consider finally the case γ < K. This case is trickier: unlike when K < γ < 1, Rϵ2,M (ϵ1) for
ϵ2 < ϵ1 can be larger or smaller than max{γ,K}, and hence can be larger or smaller than Rϵ1,M (ϵ1).
The key observation is that if there exist ϵ2 < ϵ1 such that Rϵ2,M (ϵ1) is larger than max{γ,K}, then
the function ϵ → Rϵ,M (ϵ1) is decreasing for ϵ < ϵ2. Indeed, if that function were not decreasing,
then there would exist ϵ4 < ϵ3 ≤ ϵ2 such that Rϵ3,M (wt) and Rϵ4,M (wt) would cross twice, for a
wt < M and for wt = M , contradicting Lemma IA2. Hence, there are two possibilities for ϵ close
to zero: either the function ϵ → Rϵ,M (ϵ1) is decreasing, or it is increasing. In either case, we follow
the first part of the proof to construct the limits and bounds. The argument that the limits Q(wt)
and R(wt), viewed as functions of wt, are solutions to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) is as in the
first part of the proof, for all values of γ.
We next show that limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞) and limwt→∞Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞). Consider first the
limits at zero. When γ < 1, R(wt) ≥ γ and hence (IA25) implies that Q(wt) is increasing. When
γ < 1, R(wt) ≤ γ and hence (IA25) implies that Q(wt) is decreasing. In both cases, Q(wt) is
monotone, and because it is bounded it converges to a finite limit when wt goes to zero. Suppose,
by contradiction, that limwt→0R(wt) does not exist. This means that as wt goes to zero R(wt)
oscillates more and more rapidly between maxima and minima whose distance is bounded away














after taking the limit along a sequence of maxima as wt goes to zero. Likewise, since R
′(wt) = 0 at














after taking the limit along a sequence of minima as wt goes to zero. Equations (IA44) and
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(IA45) imply lim supwt→0R(wt) = lim infwt→0R(wt), a contradiction. Since R(wt) ≥ min{γ, 1},
limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞). Consider next the limits at infinity. Since Q(wt) is bounded and mono-
tone, it converges to a finite limit, which is non-negative because Q(wt) is non-negative. If
limwt→∞Q(wt) = 0, then (IA26) and max{γ, 1} ≥ R(wt) ≥ min{γ, 1} for all wt ∈ (0,∞) imply
limwt→∞R
′(wt) = −∞, which contradicts R(wt) ≥ min{γ, 1}. Hence, limwt→∞Q(wt) ∈ (0,∞).
We finally show that the inequalities in Lemma IA4 hold. The steps are similar to those in
Lemma IA4, after replacing ϵ by zero and M by infinity, and noting that the boundary conditions
for R(wt) remain the same because of Lemma IA1. The only change concerns the proof that
R(wt) > γ for γ < 1. If in that proof the supremum m1 is zero, limwt→0R
′(wt)wt = 0 implies that
(IA38) holds as an equality.
LEMMA IA6 (Decreasing A(wt)): For the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) constructed
in Lemma IA5, A(wt) is decreasing. The same property holds for the solution constructed in
Lemma IA3, if γ < 1. If γ > 1, then the same property holds if, in addition, M is large enough
and wt ∈ [ϵ,M0] for any M0 > ϵ which is kept fixed as M grows.
Proof: We first show the property for the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) constructed
in Lemma IA5. We next extend the proof to the solution constructed in Lemma IA3.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist m2 > m1 > 0 such that A(m1) ≤ A(m2). If
A(m1) < A(m2), then there exists m3 ∈ (m1,m2) such that A′(m3) > 0. Consider the set of
wt < m3 such thatA
′(ŵt) > 0 for all ŵt ∈ (wt,m3). The infimumm within that set is strictly smaller
than m3 since A
′(wt) > 0 for all wt close to m3. It is also positive because limwt→0A(wt) = ∞
(which follows from limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞)), and it satisfies A′(m) = 0 and A′′(m) ≥ 0. Consider
next the set of wt > m3 such that A
′(ŵt) > 0 for all ŵt ∈ (m3, wt). The supremum m̂ within
that set is strictly larger than m3. It is also finite because limwt→0A(wt) = 0 (which follows from
limwt→0R(wt) ∈ (0,∞)), and it satisfies A′(m̂) = 0 and A′′(m̂) ≤ 0. Moreover, by the definition of
m and m̂, A′(wt) > 0 for all wt ∈ (m, m̂).
If A(m1) = A(m2), then points m̂ > m > 0 with the properties A
′(m) = A′(m̂) = 0, A′′(m) ≥ 0,
A′′(m̂) ≤ 0, and A′(wt) > 0 for all wt ∈ (m, m̂), can again be constructed, except that the latter
inequality can be weak. To perform the construction, we distinguish the case where there exists
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wt ∈ (m1,m2) such that A(wt) ̸= A(m1) = A(m2) and replace m1 or m2 by wt, and the case where
A(wt) = A(m1) = A(m2) for all wt ∈ (m1,m2) and take m = m1 and m̂ = m2.
Using Q(wt) instead of q(wt), we can write (IA24) as






























































where the third step follows by using A′(wt) ≥ 0 for wt ∈ (m, m̂) and (IA46). Since A′′(m) ≥ 0,
H(m) ≥ 0. Since H(wt) is increasing in (m, m̂), H(m̂) > 0, and hence A′′(m̂) > 0, a contradiction.
We next extend the proof to the solution constructed in Lemma IA3. Suppose that γ < 1. Since
R(ϵ) = max{γ,K} ≥ R(M) = γ, there exists mϵ > ϵ such that R(mϵ) = R(ϵ) and R′(mϵ) ≤ 0.
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Since R′(mϵ) ≤ 0, (IA26) implies
Q(mϵ)− r
ρ− r
R(mϵ)− 1 < 0 ⇒
Q(ϵ)− r
ρ− r
R(mϵ)− 1 < 0,
where the second step follows because Q(wt) is increasing for γ < 1. Equation (IA46) then implies
A′(ϵ) < 0. Since, R(wt) > R(M) = γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M), R′(M) ≤ 0 and hence A′(M) < 0.
Using A′(ϵ) < 0 and A′(M) < 0, we can define m and m̂ by proceeding as above, and derive a
contradiction. Suppose next that γ > 1. Since R(wt) < R(ϵ) = γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M), R′(ϵ) ≤ 0
and hence A′(ϵ) < 0. Since, in addition, for any given wt, the values of Q(wt) and R(wt) under
the solution over [ϵ,M ] converge to the values under the solution over [ϵ,∞) when M goes to
infinity, A(M0) is close to its positive limit under the solution over [ϵ,∞) for M large enough. It
is, therefore, larger than A(M) = γM for M large enough. Using A
′(ϵ) < 0 and A(M0) > A(M), we
can define m and m̂ by proceeding as above, and derive a contradiction.
The results in Theorem 1 for the case of short-lived hedgers follow from the lemmas proved
so far. Lemma IA5 yields the existence of a solution with the required boundary conditions. The
same lemma yields the comparisons between A(wt),
1
wt
and γwt . The monotonicity of q(wt) follows
from these comparisons and (IA23). Lemma IA6 yields the monotonicity of A(wt). Lemma IA1
yields the limits at zero and infinity.
We next turn to the case where hedgers are long-lived. The system of ODEs consists of (IA25),
R′(wt)wt = R(wt) [1−R(wt)] +








which replaces (IA26), and
1 =











t −R(wt) [2αwt +R(wt)− 2F ′(wt)wt]
}
[αwt +R(wt)− F ′(wt)wt]2
, (IA49)
which is (27) written in terms of Q(wt) = q(wt)
− 1
γ and R(wt) = A(wt)wt.
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The analysis in Lemma IA1 on the limits of Q(wt) and R(wt) at zero and infinity carries through.
For the limits at zero, we need to observe additionally that because limwt→0 F (wt) is finite, the
limit of F ′(wt)wt (which is assumed to exist) is zero. For the limits at infinity, we need to observe
additionally that because limwt→∞ F (wt) is finite, the limit of F
′(wt)wt (which is assumed to
exist) is zero. Lemma IA1 provides the argument for limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt (in the case of R(wt)).
The argument for limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt is similar: if limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt ̸= 0, then |F ′(wt)| ≥ ℓwt for
wt > M and for positive M and ℓ. Since, however, for wt > M
F (wt) = F (M) +
∫ wt
M










limwt→∞R(wt) would be plus or minus infinity, a contradiction. Since the limits of F
′(wt)wt at
zero and infinity are zero, the limits of [A(wt)−F ′(wt)]wt at zero and infinity are the same as those
of A(wt)wt, and hence are the same as in Lemma IA1.
The limits of F (wt) at zero and infinity follow from (IA49), the limits of Q(wt) and R(wt),
limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt = 0, limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = 0, limwt→0 F
′′(wt)w
2








then |F ′′(wt)| ≥ ℓw2t for wt < ϵ and for positive ϵ and ℓ. Since, however, for wt < ϵ
F (wt) = F (ϵ) + F
′(ϵ)(wt − ϵ) +
∫ wt
ϵ
F ′′(ŵt)(wt − ŵt)dŵt




















0 is a similar adaptation of that used to establish limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1: Part (i) follows from A(wt) being decreasing in wt, F (wt) = 0 and (23).
Part (ii) follows from the former two properties, (6) and (22). Part (iii) follows from the same two










Part (iv) follows from the same two properties and (24).
We next prove two useful lemmas on the monotonicity of R(wt) and αwt +R(wt).
LEMMA IA7 (Monotonicity of R(wt)): For the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) con-
structed in Lemma IA5, and for that constructed in Lemma IA3:
• If γ < K, then R(wt) is either decreasing for all values of wt, or is hump-shaped.
• If K < γ < 1, then R(wt) is hump-shaped.
• If γ > 1, then R(wt) is inverse hump-shaped.
Proof: We show the monotonicity properties for the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26)
constructed in Lemma IA5. The proof for the solution constructed in Lemma IA3 follows by the
same arguments and because the limits of R(wt) at zero and infinity under the former solution are
the same as the boundary conditions at ϵ and M , respectively, under the latter solution.
Consider first the case K < γ < 1. Since limwt→0R(wt) = limwt→∞R(wt) = γ and 1 >
R(wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (0,∞), there exists wt ∈ (0,∞) at which R(wt) is maximized. If R(wt) is
not hump-shaped, then there exist m1 < m2 < m3 such that R(m1) > R(m2) and R(m2) < R(m3).
We can then choose ξ ∈ (γ, 1) and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 2, 3, such that m̂1 < m1 < ˆ̂m1 ≤ m̂2 <
m2 < ˆ̂m2 ≤ m̂3 < m3 < ˆ̂m3, R(m̂i) = R( ˆ̂mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, 3, R′(m̂i) > 0 and R′( ˆ̂mi) < 0 for
i = 1, 3, R′(m̂2) < 0 and R
′( ˆ̂m2) > 0, R(wt) > ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 3, and R(wt) < ξ
for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2). Equation (IA26) implies that R̂ξ(m̂i) > 0 and R̂ξ( ˆ̂mi) < 0 for i = 1, 3, and
R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) < 0 and R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) > 0, where the function R̂ξ(wt) is defined by










Therefore, there exist m′1 ∈ (m̂1, ˆ̂m1), m′2 ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2) and m′3 ∈ (m̂3, ˆ̂m3) such that R̂ξ(m′i) = 0 for
i = 1, 2, 3, R̂′ξ(m
′
1) ≤ 0, R̂′ξ(m′2) ≥ 0 and R̂′ξ(m′3) ≤ 0. Differentiating (IA51) and using (IA26) and


























































for i = 1, 3. Likewise, since R̂ξ(m
′




















































ξ2 − (ρ− r)z(1− ξ)
]
.
If hξ ≤ 0, then Hξ(wt) is increasing in wt. Since γ < R(m′2) < ξ (because m′2 ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2)) and
R(m′3) > ξ > γ (because m
′
3 ∈ (m̂3, ˆ̂m3)), (IA55) implies that (IA54) for i = 3 should hold as
a strict inequality in the opposite direction, a contradiction. If hξ > 0, then Hξ(wt) is inverse
hump-shaped in wt. If Hξ(m
′





2), which means that m
′







1) > ξ > γ (because m
′
1 ∈ (m̂1, ˆ̂m1)), (IA54) for i = 1 implies that
(IA55) should hold as a strict inequality in the opposite direction, a contradiction.
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Consider next the case γ > 1. Since limwt→0R(wt) = limwt→∞R(wt) = γ and 1 < R(wt) < γ
for all wt ∈ (0,∞), there exists wt ∈ (0,∞) at which R(wt) is minimized. If R(wt) is not inverse
hump-shaped, then there exist m1 < m2 < m3 such that R(m1) < R(m2) and R(m2) > R(m3).
We can then choose ξ ∈ (1, γ) and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 2, 3, such that m̂1 < m1 < ˆ̂m1 ≤ m̂2 < m2 <
ˆ̂m2 ≤ m̂3 < m3 < ˆ̂m3, R′(m̂i) < 0 and R′( ˆ̂mi) > 0 for i = 1, 3, R′(m̂2) > 0 and R′( ˆ̂m2) < 0,
R(wt) < ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 3, and R(wt) > ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2). Equation (IA26)
implies that R̂ξ(m̂i) < 0 and R̂ξ( ˆ̂mi) > 0 for i = 1, 3, and R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) > 0 and R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) < 0. Therefore,
there exist m′1 ∈ (m̂1, ˆ̂m1), m′2 ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2) and m′3 ∈ (m̂3, ˆ̂m3) such that R̂ξ(m′i) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3,
R̂′ξ(m
′
1) ≤ 0, R̂′ξ(m′2) ≥ 0 and R̂′ξ(m′3) ≤ 0. Equations (IA54) and (IA55) still hold, with both
R(mi) − γ and 1 − ξ being negative. If hξ ≤ 0, in which case Hξ(wt) is increasing in wt, then
γ > R(m′2) > ξ, R(m
′
3) < ξ < γ, and (IA55) imply that (IA54) for i = 3 should hold as a strict
inequality in the opposite direction, a contradiction. If hξ > 0, in which case Hξ(wt) is inverse











1) < ξ < γ,
(IA54) for i = 1 implies that (IA55) should hold as a strict inequality in the opposite direction, a
contradiction.
Consider finally the case γ < K. Since limwt→0R(wt) = K and limwt→∞R(wt) = γ, R(wt) is
maximized at its zero limit or at a wt ∈ (0,∞). If R(wt) is not decreasing or hump-shaped, then
there exist m1 < m2 < m3 such that R(m1) > R(m2) and R(m2) < R(m3). If R(m2) ≥ K, then we
can proceed as in the case K < γ < 1 to find a contradiction. If R(m2) < K, then we can choose
ξ ∈ (γ,K) and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 2, 3, such that m̂2 < m2 < ˆ̂m2 ≤ m̂3 < m3 < ˆ̂m3, R′(m̂2) < 0 and
R′( ˆ̂m2) > 0, R
′(m̂3) > 0 and R
′( ˆ̂m3) < 0, R(wt) < ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2), and R(wt) > ξ for all
wt ∈ (m̂3, ˆ̂m3). (Note that (m̂1, ˆ̂m1) may not exist because ξ < K = limwt→0R(wt).) Equation
(IA26) implies that R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) < 0, R̂ξ( ˆ̂m2) > 0, R̂ξ(m̂3) > 0 and R̂ξ( ˆ̂m3) < 0. Therefore, there exist
m′2 ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2) and m′3 ∈ (m̂3, ˆ̂m3) such that R̂ξ(m′i) = 0 for i = 2, 3, R̂′ξ(m′2) ≥ 0 and R̂′ξ(m′3) ≤ 0.
Equations (IA54) for i = 3 and (IA55) still hold. Moreover, hξ < 0 because hξ is increasing in ξ,
ξ < K, and hK = 0 as implied by (28). Therefore, Hξ(wt) is increasing in wt, and (IA55) implies
that (IA54) for i = 3 should hold as a strict inequality in the opposite direction, a contradiction.
LEMMA IA8 (αwt +R(wt) increasing): For the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) con-
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structed in Lemma IA5, αwt+R(wt) is increasing if γ ≤ 1. The same property holds for the solution
constructed in Lemma IA3, provided that ϵ and M are small and large enough, respectively, and
that wt ∈ [ϵ,M0] for any M0 > ϵ which is kept fixed as ϵ shrinks and M grows.
Proof: We first show the property for the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) constructed
in Lemma IA5. We next extend the proof to the solution constructed in Lemma IA3. We assume
γ < 1: for γ = 1, the property trivially holds because R(wt) = 1.
Consider first the case K < γ < 1. Since R(wt) is hump-shaped (Lemma IA7), R
′(wt) > −α
for all wt ∈ (0, ŵt), where ŵt exceeds the maximizer of R(wt). Denote by m the supremum of the
set of ŵt such that R
′(wt) > −α for all wt ∈ (0, ŵt). If m is infinite, then αwt+R(wt) is increasing.
Suppose, by contradiction, that m is finite. By its definition, m satisfies R′(m) = −α, and since
R′(wt) > −α for all wt < m, it also satisfies R′′(m) ≤ 0. Differentiating (IA26) at m and using
R′(m) = −α, we find















where L(wt) ≡ [Q(wt) − r]R(wt). To derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that L′(m) ≥ 0,
since (IA56) would then imply R′′(m) > 0.




R(wt) + [Q(wt)− r]R′(wt). (IA57)
Equations (IA57), R(wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (0,∞), and R′(m) = −α < 0 imply L′(m) ≥ 0 if
Q(m) ≤ r. To show that L′(m) ≥ 0 also if Q(m) > r, we proceed by contradiction, and suppose
that L′(m) < 0. Since R′(m) = −α < 0, (IA26) implies
Q(m)− r
ρ− r
R(m)− 1 < 0 ⇒ L(m) < ρ− r.
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Since, in addition, Lemma IA1 implies that limwt→∞ L(wt) = ρ − r, there exists wt large enough
so that L(wt) > L(m) > 0. These inequalities, together with L
′(m) < 0, imply that L(wt) has a
local minimum in (m,∞). We can, therefore, choose ξ ∈ (0, L(m)), and m2 > m1 > m such that
L(mi) = ξ, L
′(m1) < 0 and L




















we can substitute Q(wt) in L
′(wt) to write the inequalities L
′(m1) < 0 and L
′(m2) > 0 as L̂ξ(m1) <










ξ − [αwt +R(wt)]
2
R(wt)2
ρ− r − ξ
ρ− r
ξ. (IA60)




+ 1 is increasing. Since, in addition, ξ ∈ (0, ρ − r), (IA60) implies
L̂ξ(m1) > L̂ξ(m2), a contradiction. Therefore, L
′(m) ≥ 0, which in turn implies that m is infinite.
Consider next the case γ < K. To show the result it suffices to show that R′(wt) > −α for wt
close to zero, since we can then define the supremum m and proceed as in the case K < γ < 1.
To show that R′(wt) > −α for wt close to zero, we study the behavior of (Q(wt), R(wt)). Since







for small ϵ and wt. If
K−γ
γ > 1 ⇔ K > 2γ, then Q(wt) is of order smaller than wt, and we look for
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a differentiable R(wt). Using (IA26), R(0) = K and L’Hospital’s rule, we find































If K−γγ < 1 ⇔ K < 2γ, then Q(wt) is of order larger than wt, and we look for R(wt) that is of the








































Identifying terms in w
K−γ























































where the last step follows from (28). Since g > 0, R(wt) is increasing for wt close to zero, which
means that R′(wt) ≥ 0 > −α.
We next extend the proof to the solution constructed in Lemma IA3. Consider first the case
K < γ < 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that the supremumm of the set of ŵt such that R
′(wt) > −α
for all wt ∈ [ϵ, ŵt) is smaller than M0. To derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that L′(m) ≥ 0.
Recall from Lemma IA5 that for any given wt, the values of Q(wt) and R(wt) under the solution
over [ϵ,M ] converge to the values under the solution over [ϵ,∞) when M goes to infinity. Since
m ≤ M0 and M0 is kept fixed when M grows large, L(m) is close to its positive limit under the
solution over [ϵ,∞) for M large enough. Hence, L(m) < ρ − r. Moreover, same arguments as
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in Lemmas IA1 and IA5 imply that under the solution over [ϵ,∞), limwt→∞Q(wt) = r +
ρ−r
γ
and limwt→∞R(wt) = γ (as is the case under the solution over (0,∞)). Hence, there exists wt
large enough such that L(wt) is close to ρ − r and hence larger than L(m). We can then derive a
contradiction, proceeding as above. Consider next the case γ < K. Since R′(wt) > −α for small
wt under the solution over (0,∞), the same inequality holds under the solution over [ϵ,M ] for ϵ
small enough by continuity. We can then derive a contradiction, proceeding as above.
Proof of Theorem 2: The comparative statics in the theorem can be stated equivalently in terms
of R(wt): R(wt) is increasing in α and u
⊤Σu if γ < 1, and is decreasing in α and u⊤Σu if γ > 1.
We show the latter comparative statics on the solution constructed in Lemma IA3, which is over
the finite interval [ϵ,M ]. We fix any M0 > ϵ, and show that the comparative statics hold for all
wt ∈ (ϵ,M0), provided that ϵ and M are small and large enough, respectively. Since for any given
wt ∈ (0,∞), (Q(wt), R(wt)) for the solution over (0,∞) are obtained as limits of (Q(wt), R(wt))
for the solution over [ϵ,M ] when ϵ goes to zero and M goes to infinity, the inequalities established
for (ϵ,M0) carry through to (0,∞).
The comparative statics with respect to u⊤Σu are equivalent to those with respect to z, and
we show the latter. We start with the case K < γ < 1, and denote the solution to the system of
(IA25) and (IA26) by the subscript z. Since Rz(ϵ) = γ for all z, differentiating (IA26) with respect





















We will show that (i) Rz(wt) < Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z and for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ, and (ii) Rz(wt) ≤ Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z, for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0),
and for M large enough. These results will be shown by contradiction.
Suppose that Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z and for all wt > ϵ in a neighbor-
hood of ϵ. Since Rz(M) = Rẑ(M) = γ, the set of wt > ϵ such that Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt) is non-empty.
The infimum m within that set is strictly larger than ϵ since Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ. Since Rẑ(wt) crosses Rz(wt) from above at ϵ,
∂R′z(ϵ)
∂z ≤ 0, and since it crosses
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Rz(wt) from below at m,
∂R′z(m)
∂z ≥ 0.























































where the second step follows because integrating (IA25) from ϵ to m yields








15For expositional simplicity, we are treating m as independent of ẑ for ẑ close to z. When m is a function m(ẑ)
of ẑ, the property
∂R′z(m)
∂z
≥ 0 holds for a non-empty set of m, for example, for lim inf ẑ→z m(ẑ) and lim supẑ→z m(ẑ).
Our argument requires choosing one such m.
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Equations (IA62) and ∂R
′
z(ϵ)












































































































where the fourth step follows because Qz(wt) is increasing and R(wt) > γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M),








∂z ≤ 0, and the sixth step follows from (IA64). This contradicts
∂R′z(m)
∂z ≥ 0.
Hence, it is not possible that Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ. This implies
that Rz(wt) < Rẑ(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ.
16
Consider next the infimum m > ϵ within the set of wt > ϵ such that Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt) and
Rz(ŵt) > Rẑ(ŵt) for all ŵt > wt in a neighborhood of wt. This set is non-empty because it
includes M . Our intended comparative statics result will follow if m ≥ M0 since in that case
Rz(wt) ≤ Rẑ(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0). Suppose that m < M0. Since Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for all
wt > m in a neighborhood of m, we can consider the infimum m̂ > m within the non-empty set of
wt > m such that Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt). Since Rẑ(wt) crosses Rz(wt) from above at m,
∂R′z(m)
∂z ≤ 0,




are equal to zero.
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and since it crosses Rz(wt) from below at m̂,
∂R′z(m̂)
∂z ≥ 0.
Equations (IA63) and ∂R
′
z(m)

























The counterpart of (IA64) written between m and m̂ instead of between ϵ and m, ∂R
′
z(m̂)





















































where the second step follows from the counterpart of (IA65) written between m and m̂ and the
third step follows by dividing both sides by Qz(m)Rz(m).










Equation (IA26) implies Nz(wt) > 0 for all wt for which R
′
z(wt) ≤ 0. The same inequality holds
for all wt for which Rz(wt) > 0: this follows because Qz(wt) is increasing and because for all wt
such that Rz(wt) > 0, there exists ŵt > wt such that Rz(wt) = Rz(ŵt) and R
′
z(ŵt) ≤ 0. Consider
now M large enough, and recall from Lemma IA5 that for any given wt, the values of Qz(wt)
and Rz(wt) under the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) over [ϵ,M ] converge to the
values under the solution over [ϵ,∞) when M goes to infinity. Since m < M0 and M0 is kept
fixed when M grows large, Nz(m) is close to its positive limit under the solution over [ϵ,∞) for M
33
large enough. Moreover, same arguments as in Lemmas IA1 and IA5 imply that under the solution
over [ϵ,∞), limwt→∞Qz(wt) = r +
ρ−r
γ (as is the case under the solution over (0,∞)). Picking m
such that Qz(m) is close to r +
ρ−r
γ for M large enough, and noting that Qz(wt) is increasing and
Rz(wt) > γ, we can bound Nz(wt) from above by a small positive constant for all wt ≥ m and for
M large enough. Hence, for all wt ≥ m and for M large enough, Nz(wt) is smaller than Nz(m)
minus a positive constant.
If the inequalityNz(m) ≤ Nz(m̂) is strict, then we can choose ξ ∈ (Nz(m), Nz(m̂)), m1 ∈ (m, m̂)
and m2 ∈ (m̂,M), such that Nz(mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, G′(m1) ≥ 0 and G′(m2) ≤ 0. Values ξ > 0
and m1 < m2 such that Nz(mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, G
′(m1) ≥ 0 and G′(m2) ≤ 0 can also be chosen
if Nz(m) = Nz(m̂). Indeed, if minwt∈[m,m̂]Nz(wt) < Nz(m) = Nz(m̂), then we choose ξ close to
and smaller than Nz(m) = Nz(m̂), m1 ∈ (m, m̂) and m2 ∈ (m̂,M). If Nz(wt) = Nz(m) = Nz(m̂)
for all wt ∈ (m, m̂), then we choose ξ = Nz(m) = Nz(m̂) and any m1 < m2 in (m, m̂). If, finally,
maxwt∈[m,m̂]Nz(wt) > Nz(m) = Nz(m̂), then we replace m̂ by the maximizer of Nz(wt) in [m, m̂],
and proceed as in the case where the inequality is strict.











Equations (IA25) and (IA26) imply
















Nz(wt) = ξ ⇒ Qz(wt) =
1







we can substitute Qz(wt) in N
′
z(wt) to write the inequalities N
′
z(m1) ≥ 0 and N ′z(m2) ≤ 0 as









− 1− [αwt +Rz(wt)]
2
Rz(wt)2
rRz(wt) + ρ− r
1 + z(ρ− r)ξ
ξ. (IA69)
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We will show that N̂zξ(m1) > N̂zξ(m2), which will yield a contradiction because N̂zξ(m1) ≤ 0 and
N̂zξ(m2) ≥ 0. As a first step to show that result, we will show that
αm1 +Rz(m1) < αm2 +Rz(m2). (IA70)
If m2 > m1 +
1−γ
α , then (IA70) follows from Rz(wt) ∈ (γ, 1) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M). If m2 < m1 +
1−γ
α ,
then (IA70) follows from Lemma IA8 by noting that m1 < m̂ < m and setting M0 = m +
1−γ
α .









− 1− [αm2 +Rz(m2)]
αm1 +Rz(m1)
Rz(m1)
rRz(wt) + ρ− r
Rz(m1)[1 + z(ρ− r)ξ]
ξ.
(IA71)








in Rz(wt), and ξ > 0, (IA71) implies N̂zξ(m1) > N̂zξ(m2).
Consider next the case γ < K. Since Rz(ϵ) is increasing in z, Rz(wt) < Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and
larger than z and for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ. Therefore, we are left to show result (ii) of
the case K < γ < 1, namely, Rz(wt) ≤ Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z, for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0),
and for M large enough. We define m as in that case, suppose that m < M0, and define m̂. We
then follow the same arguments to derive a contradiction.
Consider finally the case γ > 1. We will show, proceeding by contradiction, that (i) Rz(wt) >
Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z and for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ, and (ii) Rz(wt) ≥
Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z, for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0), and for M large enough.
Suppose that Rz(wt) < Rẑ(wt) for ẑ close to and larger than z and for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ. Consider the infimum m > ϵ within the non-empty set of wt > ϵ such that
Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt). Since Rẑ(wt) crosses Rz(wt) from below at ϵ,
∂R′z(ϵ)
∂z ≥ 0, and since it crosses
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Rz(wt) from above at m,
∂R′z(m)
∂z ≤ 0. Equations (IA62) and
∂R′z(ϵ)


























































































where the third step follows because Qz(wt) is decreasing and R(wt) < γ for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M),








∂z ≥ 0, and the fifth step follows from (IA64). This contradicts
∂R′z(m)
∂z ≤ 0.
Hence, Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ.
Consider next the infimumm > ϵ within the non-empty set of wt > ϵ such that Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt)
and Rz(ŵt) < Rẑ(ŵt) for all ŵt > wt in a neighborhood of wt. Our intended comparative statics
result will follow if m ≥ M0 since in that case Rz(wt) ≥ Rẑ(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0). Suppose
that m < M0. Since Rz(wt) > Rẑ(wt) for all wt > m in a neighborhood of m, we can consider
the infimum m̂ > m within the non-empty set of wt > m such that Rz(wt) = Rẑ(wt). Since
Rẑ(wt) crosses Rz(wt) from below at m,
∂R′z(m)




∂z ≤ 0. Proceeding as in the case K < γ < 1, we can then show that Nz(m) ≥ Nz(m̂),
− 1z(ρ−r) < Nz(wt) < 0 for all wt ∈ [ϵ,M ], and Nz(wt) exceeds Nz(m) plus a positive constant for all
wt larger than a fixed m and for M large enough. We can then choose ξ ∈ (− 1z(ρ−r) , 0) and m1 < m2
such that Nz(mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, N
′
z(m1) ≤ 0 and N ′z(m2) ≥ 0. The latter two inequalities can
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be written as N̂zξ(m1) ≥ 0 and N̂zξ(m2) ≤ 0. We will show that N̂zξ(m1) < N̂zξ(m2), which will
yield a contradiction because N̂zξ(m1) ≥ 0 and N̂zξ(m2) ≤ 0. As a first step to show that result,
we will show that
Az(m1) > Az(m2). (IA72)
If m2 > γm1, then (IA72) follows from Rz(wt) ∈ (1, γ) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M). If m2 > γm1, then
(IA72) follows from Lemma IA6 by noting that m1 < m̂ < m and setting M0 = γm1. Using
αm1+Rz(m1)
Rz(m1)
< αm2+Rz(m2)Rz(m2) , which is implied from (IA72), and ξ ∈ (−
1









− 1− [αm2 +Rz(m2)]
2
Rz(m2)2
rRz(wt) + ρ− r
1 + z(ρ− r)ξ
ξ. (IA73)
Since Qz(wt) is decreasing, (IA68) implies Rz(m1) < Rz(m2). Combining with (IA71) and ξ ∈
(− 1z(ρ−r) , 0), we find N̂zξ(m1) < N̂zξ(m2).
We next derive comparative statics with respect to α. We start with the case K < γ < 1, and
denote the solution to the system of (IA25) and (IA26) by the subscript α. Since Rα(ϵ) = γ for all




















We will show that (i) Rα(wt) < Rα̂(wt) for α̂ close to and larger than α and for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ, and (ii) Rα(wt) ≤ Rα̂(wt) for α̂ close to and larger than α, for all wt ∈ (ϵ,M0),
and for M large enough. These results will be shown by contradiction, using similar arguments as
for the comparative statics with respect to z.
Suppose that Rα(wt) > Rα̂(wt) for α̂ close to and larger than α and for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ. Consider the infimum m > ϵ within the non-empty set of wt > ϵ such that
Rα(wt) = Rα̂(wt). Since Rα̂(wt) crosses Rα(wt) from above at ϵ,
∂R′α(ϵ)
∂z ≤ 0, and since it crosses
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Rα(wt) from below at m,
∂R′α(m)




















































Equations (IA74) and ∂R
′
α(ϵ)

































































































































































where the second step follows from (IA65) (with subscript α rather than z) and because Rα(wt) >












∂α ≥ 0. Hence, it is not possible that Rα(wt) > Rα̂(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a
neighborhood of ϵ. Instead, Rα(wt) < Rα̂(wt) for all wt > ϵ in a neighborhood of ϵ.
Consider next the infimumm > ϵ within the non-empty set of wt > ϵ such that Rα(wt) = Rα̂(wt)
and Rα(ŵt) > Rα̂(ŵt) for all ŵt > wt in a neighborhood of wt. Our intended comparative statics
result will follow if m ≥ M0. Suppose that m < M0. Since Rα(wt) > Rα̂(wt) for all wt > m in a
neighborhood of m, we can consider the infimum m̂ > m within the non-empty set of wt > m such
that Rα(wt) = Rα̂(wt). Since Rα̂(wt) crosses Rα(wt) from above at m,
∂R′α(m)
∂α ≤ 0, and since it
crosses Rz(wt) from below at m̂,
∂R′α(m̂)
∂α ≥ 0.
































because Aα(wt) is decreasing (Lemma IA6), Nα(m) ≤ Nα(m̂) implies Nz(m) < Nz(m̂). Since, in
addition, Nz(wt) is smaller than Nz(m) minus a positive constant for all wt larger than a fixed m
and for M large enough, the arguments used to establish the comparative statics with respect to
z yield a contradiction. The comparative statics with respect to α in the cases γ < K and γ > 1
follow by similarly adapting the arguments used to establish the comparative statics with respect
to z.
Proof of Corollary 2: The first statement in part (i) follows from (23), F (wt) = 0, and A(wt) being
decreasing in α when γ > 1 and independent of α when γ = 1. Since for γ < K and small wt,
A(wt) ≈ Kwt , the second statement in part (i) follows from (23) and F (wt) = 0 if
α
K is decreasing in







































where the second step follows by differentiating implicitlyK with respect to α using (28). Therefore,
α
K is decreasing in α if z < 1. The third statement in part (i) follows from (24), F (wt) = 0,
and A(wt) being increasing in α when γ < 1 and independent of α when γ = 1. The first
statement in part (ii) follows from (23), F (wt) = 0 and A(wt) being decreasing in u
⊤Σu when
γ > 1. The second statement in part (ii) follows from the former two properties and A(wt) being
increasing in u⊤Σu when γ < 1. The third statement in part (ii) follows from (24), F (wt) = 0
and A(wt) being increasing in α when γ < 1. The result for long-lived hedgers follows from (23),
limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt = 0, and because the asymptotic behavior of A(wt) for wt close to zero is the
same as for short-lived hedgers.
Proof of Proposition 5: Substituting (22), (23) and (IA14) into (IA4) and (IA5), we can write the
40
dynamics of arbitrageur wealth wt as























′′ = 0 (IA81)
















′ = 0. (IA83)



















We can determine the multiplicative constant D(1) by the requirement that d(wt) must integrate













dwt = 1. (IA86)
Equation (IA86) determines a positive D(1), and hence a positive d(wt), if the integral multiplying
D(1) is finite. If the integral is infinite, then (IA86) implies that D(1) = 0, and the stationary
distribution does not have a density but is concentrated at zero. The integral multiplying D(1) is
infinite when the integrand converges to infinity at a fast enough rate when wt goes to zero, or does
not converge to zero at a fast enough rate when wt goes to infinity.
































































































Substituting (IA87) into (IA86) to solve for D(1), and substituting back into (IA87), we find (29).
Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K} and limwt→0 F ′(wt)wt = 0, for wt close to zero the numer-
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where Ψ0 is a positive constant. These functions are integrable at zero if z > 1, and not integrable
at zero if z < 1. Hence, the numerator of (29) has the same properties. Since limwt→∞A(wt)wt = γ
and limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = 0, for wt close to infinity the numerator of (29) is bounded above by a





















where Ψ∞ is a positive constant. This function is integrable at infinity, and hence the numerator
of (29) has the same property. Therefore, the integral in the denominator of (29) is finite if z > 1
and infinite if z < 1.










































[2αzwt − (αwt + 1)− (αwt + 1)αwt(αwt + 2)]









Φ(x) ≡ x3 + 3x2 + (3− 2z)x+ 1
43
is equal to 1 for x = 0, and its derivative with respect to x is
Φ′(x) = 3x2 + 6x+ (3− 2z).
If z < 32 , then Φ
′(x) > 0 for all x > 0, and hence Φ(x) > 0 for all x > 0. If z > 32 , then Φ
′(x) has
the positive root





and is negative for 0 < x < x′1 and positive for x > x
′
1. Therefore, if Φ(x
′
1) > 0 then Φ(x) > 0 for
all x > 0, and if Φ(x′1) < 0 then Φ(x) has two positive roots x1 < x
′
1 < x2 and is positive outside





































> 0 ⇔ z < 27
8
,
and is negative if z > 278 . Therefore, if z <
27
8 then the derivative of d(wt) is negative, and if z >
27
8
then the derivative of d(wt) is negative for wt ∈ (0,m1) ∪ (m2,∞) and positive for wt ∈ (m1,m2),
where mi ≡ xiα for i = 1, 2. This proves Parts (i) and (ii).
The density d(wt) shifts to the right in the monotone likelihood ratio sense when a parameter
θ increases if
∂2 log [d(wt, θ)]
∂θ∂wt
> 0. (IA89)














An increase in α (which also affects z from (25)) raises the right-hand side of (IA90). Therefore,
d(wt) satisfies (IA89) with respect to α. An increase in z also raises the right-hand side of (IA90).
44
Therefore, d(wt) satisfies (IA89) with respect to u
⊤Σu. This proves Part (iii).
II. Proofs of the Results in Section III of the Main Article
Proof of Lemma 1: Using (1) and (33), we can write (36) and (37) as
dvt = (rvt − c̄t)dt+X⊤t (µSt + D̄ − rSt)dt+ u⊤D̄dt+
(




dwt = (rwt − ct)dt+ Y ⊤t (µSt + D̄ − rSt)dt+ Y ⊤t (σSt + σ)⊤dBt, (IA92)
respectively. If St, Xt, and Yt satisfy (39), (40), and (41), then (IA91) is identical to (8), and
(IA92) to (13). Therefore, if xt and yt maximize the objective of hedgers and of arbitrageurs,
respectively, given πt, then the same is true for Xt and Yt, given St. Moreover, if xt and yt satisfy
the market-clearing equation (20), then Xt and Yt satisfy the market-clearing equation (38) because
of (40) and (41). Since (IA91) is identical to (8), and (IA92) to (13), the dynamics of arbitrageur
wealth and the exposures of hedgers and arbitrageurs to the Brownian shocks are the same in the
equilibrium (St, Xt, Yt) as in (πt, xt, yt). The market prices ηt of the Brownian risks in the two
equilibria are (σ⊤)−1(D̄ − πt) and
(
(σSt + σ)
⊤)−1 (µSt + D̄ − rSt), and are the same because of









and are the same because of (39) and (41).


































where the second step follows from (IA80). Multiplying (39) from the left by (σSt+σ)
⊤, and using
(22), we find



















Setting S(wt) ≡ D̄r + Ŝ(wt), we find that the resulting ODE equates linear terms in Ŝ(wt), Ŝ
′(wt)
and Ŝ′′(wt) to a scalar times Σu. Hence, Ŝ(wt) must be collinear to Σu, which means that S(wt)
must have the form in (42). Substituting (42) into (IA96), we find that g(wt) solves the ODE (43).
Substituting µSt from (IA93) into (34), and using (42) and (43), we can write expected excess
returns as (44). Substituting σSt from (IA94) into (35), and using (42), we can write the covariance
matrix of returns as (45).
Proof of Theorem 3: We start with the case where hedgers are short-lived. Since q(wt) and A(wt)
are continuous and positive in (0,∞), the functions multiplying g(wt), g′(wt) and g′′(wt) in (43)
are continuous. Since, in addition, (43) is a linear ODE, it has a unique solution over any interval
[ϵ,M ] ⊂ (0,∞) with initial conditions g(ϵ) and g′(ϵ) (Murray and Miller (2013)). That solution
can be extended over (0,∞). We next derive properties of solutions to (43), as well as the existence
result, through a number of lemmas that parallel those in the proof of Theorem 1.
LEMMA IA9 (Limits at zero and infinity): Consider a solution g(wt) to (43), defined over the
interval (0,∞). If the limits of g(wt) at zero and infinity are finite, then they are equal to −αr and
zero, respectively.
Proof: We first derive the limit at zero. Suppose that limwt→0 g
′(wt)wt exists, in which case it is
zero (as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 in the case of R(wt)). Since limwt→0 g(wt) is assumed to
exist, (43) implies that limwt→0
g′′(wt)
[α+A(wt)]2













and hence limwt→0 g
′′(wt)w
2




t exists, it is zero. Taking the limit of both sides of (43) when wt goes to
zero and using limwt→0 g
′(wt)wt = limwt→0 g
′′(wt)w
2
t = 0, limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K} and
limwt→0 q(wt)
− 1
γ ∈ (0,∞), we find limwt→0 g(wt) = −αr .
To complete the proof for the limit at zero, we need to show that limwt→0 g
′(wt)wt exists. We
proceed by contradiction and assume that limwt→0 g




′(wt)wt oscillates between values close to lim supwt→0 g
′(wt)wt and val-
ues close to lim infwt→0 g
′(wt)wt, there exists ξ ∈ (lim infwt→0 g′(wt)wt, lim supwt→0 g
′(wt)wt) and




















must also alternate between being non-positive and non-negative. Taking the limit of (43) along
























ξ can be non-zero and with a sign that does not change, a contradiction.
We next derive the limit at infinity. Suppose that limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt exists, in which case it
is zero. The same argument as for the limit at zero implies that limwt→∞ g
′′(wt) exists. That
limit has to be zero since limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = 0. Taking the limit of both sides of (43) when
wt goes to zero and using limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = limwt→∞ g
′′(wt) = 0, limwt→∞A(wt) = 0 and
limwt→∞ q(wt)
− 1
γ ∈ (0,∞), we find limwt→∞ g(wt) = 0. The existence of limwt→∞ g′(wt)wt follows
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by adapting the contradiction argument used for the limit at zero.
LEMMA IA10 (Single crossing of solutions): Consider two solutions g1(wt) and g2(wt) to (43) with




2(ϵ) for ϵ > 0. The solutions compare as follows:
• g1(wt) > g2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞), and g1(wt) < g2(wt) for all wt ∈ (0, ϵ).
• g′1(wt) > g′2(wt) for all wt ∈ (0,∞).





g2(wt) for wt close to and larger than ϵ. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that there exists
wt > ϵ such that g1(wt) ≤ g2(wt) or g′1(wt) ≤ g′2(wt). The infimum m within that set is strictly




2(wt) for wt close to and larger than ϵ. Since




2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), g1(m) > g2(m). Hence, g′1(m) must be equal




2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), g′′1(m) ≤ g′′2(m). Equation (43) then implies
g1(m) ≤ g2(m), a contradiction. Therefore, g1(wt) > g2(wt) and g′1(wt) > g′2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞).
The inequalities for wt < ϵ follow from a similar argument (developed in the case of Q(wt) and
R(wt) in Lemma IA2).
LEMMA IA11 (Boundary conditions over finite interval): For any ϵ > 0 and M > ϵ, there exists a
unique solution to (43) defined over the interval (0,∞) that satisfies g(ϵ) = −αr and g(M) = 0.
Proof: We will consider solutions to (43) with g(ϵ) = −αr , and show that there exists a unique g
′(ϵ)
such that g(M) = 0. For any ℓ ∈ (−∞,∞), the linear ODE (43) has a unique solution over [ϵ,M ]
with initial conditions g(ϵ) = −αr and g
′(ϵ) = ℓ, and that solution can be extended over (0,∞). We
denote the solution derived for g′(ϵ) = ℓ by gℓ(wt).
Consider the solutions g0(wt) and g1(wt). Since the ODE (43) is linear, the function h(wt) ≡
g0(wt) + ℓ [g1(wt)− g0(wt)] is also a solution. Since, in addition, h(ϵ) = −αr and h
′(ϵ) = ℓ, h(wt)
coincides with the solution gℓ(wt).




0(ϵ), Lemma IA10 implies g1(wt) − g0(wt) > 0 for all
wt ∈ (ϵ,∞). Therefore, the function ℓ −→ g0(M) + ℓ [g1(M)− g0(M)] = gℓ(M) is invertible, and
so there exists a unique ℓ such that gℓ(M) = 0. The function gℓ(wt) corresponding to that ℓ is the
required solution.
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LEMMA IA12 (Negative and increasing g(wt)): For any ϵ > 0 and M > ϵ, the solution to (43)
constructed in Lemma IA11 is negative for all wt in [ϵ,M) and increasing.
Proof: We first show that the ℓ determined in Lemma IA11 is positive. Since gℓ(M) = 0, g1(M)−
g0(M) > 0 and gℓ(M) = g0(M) + ℓ [g1(M)− g0(M)], we need to show that g0(M) < 0. We will




0(ϵ) = 0 in (43), we
find g′′0(ϵ) < 0. Hence, g
′
0(wt) < 0 and g0(wt) < −αr for wt close to and larger than ϵ. Proceeding
by contradiction, suppose that there exists wt > ϵ such that g0(wt) ≥ −αr or g
′
0(wt) ≥ 0. The
infimum m within that set is strictly larger than ϵ since g0(wt) < −αr and g
′
0(wt) < 0 for wt close
to and larger than ϵ. Since g0(ϵ) = −αr and g
′
0(wt) < 0 for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), g0(m) < −αr . Hence,
g′0(m) must be equal to zero. Since g
′
0(wt) < 0 for all wt ∈ (ϵ,m), g′′0(m) ≥ 0. Since, however,
g0(m) < −αr and g
′(m) = 0, (43) implies g′′0(m) < 0, a contradiction. Therefore, g0(wt) < −αr and
g′0(wt) < 0 for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞). This in turn implies g0(M) < 0 and ℓ > 0.
We next show that gℓ(wt) < gℓ(ŵt) for all wt < ŵt in [ϵ,M ]. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there exist m2 > m1 in [ϵ,M ] such that gℓ(m1) ≥ gℓ(m2). If gℓ(m1) > gℓ(m2), then there exists
m3 ∈ (m1,m2) such that gℓ(m3) = gℓ(m1)+gℓ(m2)2 . Since g
′
ℓ(ϵ) = ℓ > 0 and gℓ(m1) > gℓ(m3), gℓ(wt)
reaches its maximum value over [ϵ,m3] at an interior point m. Setting g
′
ℓ(m) = 0 in (43), we find
that g′′ℓ (m) has the same sign as
A(m)
α+A(m) + rgℓ(m). Since g
′′
ℓ (m) ≤ 0 at a maximum,
A(m)
α+A(m)




Since gℓ(m3) < gℓ(m) < 0 = gℓ(M) and gℓ(m3) > gℓ(m2), gℓ(wt) reaches its minimum value in
[m3,M ] at an interior point m̂ > m3. Setting g
′
ℓ(m̂) = 0 in (43), we find that g
′′
ℓ (m̂) has the same
sign as A(m̂)α+A(m̂) + rgℓ(m̂). Since g
′′
ℓ (m̂) ≥ 0 at a minimum,
A(m̂)
α+A(m̂)




Since A(wt) is decreasing, (IA97) and (IA98) imply gℓ(m) < gℓ(m̂). Since, however, m is the
maximizer of gℓ(wt) over [ϵ,m3] and m̂ is the minimizer of gℓ(wt) over [m3,M ], gℓ(m) > gℓ(m̂),
a contradiction. If gℓ(m1) = gℓ(m2), a contradiction can be derived through the same argument,
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by distinguishing the case where there exists wt ∈ (m1,m2) such that gℓ(wt) ̸= gℓ(m1) = gℓ(m2)
and replacing m1 or m2 by wt, and the case where gℓ(wt) = gℓ(m1) = gℓ(m2) for all wt ∈ (m1,m2)
and taking m1+m22 for m3. Therefore, gℓ(wt) < gℓ(ŵt) for all wt < ŵt in [ϵ,M ]. Since gℓ(M) = 0,
gℓ(wt) < 0 for all wt ∈ [ϵ,M).
LEMMA IA13 (Boundary conditions over [0,∞]): A solution to (43), defined over the interval
(0,∞), and with finite limits at zero and infinity, exists. That solution is negative and increasing.
Proof: We will construct the solution as the simple limit of solutions with boundary conditions
at ϵ and M . Denote the solution constructed in Lemma IA11 by gϵ,M (wt). Since for M2 > M1,




and hence gϵ,M1(wt) > gϵ,M2(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞). This means that the function M → gϵ,M (wt),
defined for given wt > ϵ and for M > wt, is decreasing. Since that function is bounded below by
−αr (as implied by Lemma IA12), it converges to a finite limit, denoted by gϵ(wt), when M goes to
infinity. That limit satisfies 0 ≥ gϵ(wt) ≥ −αr for all wt ∈ (ϵ,∞) and gϵ(wt) ≤ gϵ(ŵt) for all wt < ŵt
in (ϵ,∞) because these inequalities hold (strictly) for gϵ,M (wt) over (ϵ,M) (Lemma IA12).
We next take the limit of gϵ(wt) when ϵ goes to zero. Since for ϵ2 < ϵ1 and for all M > ϵ1,
gϵ2,M (ϵ1) > −αr = gϵ1,M (ϵ1) (as implied by Lemma IA12), Lemma IA10 (applied with M rather
than ϵ as starting value) implies g′ϵ2,M (M) < g
′
ϵ1,M
(M), and hence gϵ2,M (wt) > gϵ1,M (wt) for all
wt ∈ (0,M). Taking limits when M goes to infinity, we find gϵ2(wt) ≥ gϵ1(wt) for all wt ∈ (ϵ1,∞).
Hence, the function ϵ → gϵ(wt), defined for given wt > ϵ, is increasing. Since that function is
bounded above by zero, it converges to a finite limit, denoted by g(wt), when ϵ goes to zero. That
limit satisfies 0 ≥ g(wt) ≥ −αr for all wt ∈ (0,∞) and g(wt) ≤ g(ŵt) for all wt < ŵt in (0,∞)
because these inequalities hold for gϵ(wt) over (ϵ,∞).
Following a similar argument as in Lemma IA5, we can show that g(wt), viewed as a function
of wt, solves the ODE (43). Since 0 ≥ g(wt) ≥ −αr for all wt ∈ (0,∞) and g(wt) ≤ g(ŵt) for
all wt < ŵt in (0,∞), g(wt) has finite limits at zero and infinity. To show that g(wt) is negative
and increasing, we need to show that the inequalities 0 ≥ g(wt) ≥ −αr for all wt ∈ (0,∞) and
g(wt) ≤ g(ŵt) for all wt < ŵt in (0,∞) are strict. This can be done following a similar argument
as in Lemma IA12.
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When hedgers are long-lived, the analysis in Lemma IA9 carries through, by observing addi-
tionally that limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt = limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8: Showing that the effects of wt on variance, covariance and correlation
converge to zero when wt goes to zero and to infinity amounts to showing that limwt→0 f(wt) =
limwt→∞ f(wt) = 0. To show that limwt→0 f(wt) = 0, we multiply the numerator and denominator






α limwt→0wt + limwt→0A(wt)wt − limwt→0 F ′(wt)wt
. (IA99)
Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K}, limwt→0 F ′(wt)wt = 0 and limwt→0 g′(wt)wt = 0, (IA99)
implies limwt→0 f(wt) = 0. To show that limwt→∞ f(wt) = 0, we follow the same procedure and
note that limwt→∞A(wt)wt = γ, limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = 0 and limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = 0.
We next show that when hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic preferences,
f(wt) is hump-shaped. Since limwt→0 f(wt) = limwt→∞ f(wt) = 0, f(wt) ≥ 0 for all wt ∈ (0,∞)
and f(wt) > 0 for at least some wt ∈ (0,∞), there exists wt ∈ (0,∞) at which f(wt) is maximized.
If f(wt) is not hump-shaped, then we can proceed as in Lemma IA7 and choose ξ > 0 and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi)
for i = 1, 2, 3, such that m̂1 < ˆ̂m1 ≤ m̂2 < ˆ̂m2 ≤ m̂3 < ˆ̂m3, f(m̂i) = f( ˆ̂mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, 3,
f ′(m̂i) > 0 and f
′( ˆ̂mi) < 0 for i = 1, 3, f
′(m̂2) < 0 and f
′( ˆ̂m2) > 0, f(wt) > ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂i, ˆ̂mi)
for i = 1, 3, and f(wt) < ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2).






































Using (IA101) and f(m̂i) = f( ˆ̂mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, 3, we find f̂ξ(m̂i) > 0 and f̂ξ( ˆ̂mi) < 0 for i = 1, 3,



































[αwt + log(wt)] +

























[αm̂1 + log(m̂1)] . (IA104)















fξ(wt) is decreasing, increasing, and
then decreasing. Since
¯̂
fξ(wt) converges to minus infinity when wt goes to zero, it starts being
increasing, and since it converges to infinity when wt goes to infinity, it ends being increasing.
Hence, its first derivative changes sign at least four times, from positive, to negative, to positive,
to negative, to positive. Moreover, its second derivative changes sign at least three times, from













































The derivative of P (wt) has the same sign as the expression
(2− αwt)(1 + αwt) + 6αu⊤Σuξ(1− 2αwt),
which is quadratic in wt, positive for wt = 0, and has a unique positive root. Hence, P (wt) is
hump-shaped, which means that
¯̂
f ′′ξ (wt) can change sign at most twice, from negative, to positive,
to negative. This yields a contradiction, and hence f(wt) is hump-shaped.
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition follow from (45) and f(wt) being hump-shaped. To show







{f(wt) [u⊤Σuf(wt) + 2] (Σu)2n +Σnn}
{
f(wt) [u⊤Σuf(wt) + 2] (Σu)2n′ +Σn′n′
} .
(IA107)
Differentiating (IA107) with respect to f(wt), we find that Corrt(dRnt, dRn′t) is increasing in f(wt)
if (47) holds and is decreasing in f(wt) if (47) holds in the opposite direction. Part (iii) then follows
from f(wt) being hump-shaped.
Proof of Proposition 9: We start by proving a lemma on the limit of g′(wt) when wt goes to zero.
LEMMA IA14 (Limit of g′(wt) at zero): For the solution to (43) constructed in Lemma IA13, the











] if γ > K.


















which can be derived from (43) by subtracting α from both sides and dividing by wt. Consider
first the case γ > K, and suppose that g′(wt) converges to a finite limit when wt goes to zero.
Since limwt→0 g












γ . Since, in addition, q(wt)
− 1
γ converges to a finite
limit when wt goes to zero, (IA108) implies that g
′′(wt)wt must converge to a finite limit, which
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has to be zero because limwt→0 g
′(wt) is finite. Taking the limit of both sides of (IA108) when wt













γ = limwt→0Q(wt) from (IA28) into (IA109), we find that limwt→0 g
′(wt)
is as in the lemma.
To complete the proof of the lemma for γ > K, we need to show that g′(wt) converges to
a finite limit when wt goes to zero, and does not have no limit or converge to infinity. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that limwt→0 g




′(wt) oscillates between values close to lim supwt→0 g
′(wt) and val-
ues close to lim infwt→0 g
′(wt), there exist ξ > ξ̂ in (lim infwt→0 g
′(wt), lim supwt→0 g
′(wt)) and
sequences {wtn}n∈N and {ŵtn}n∈N converging to zero with the following properties. For the for-
mer sequence, g′(wtn) = ξ, g
′′(ŵtn) alternates between being non-positive and non-negative, and
g′(wt) ≥ ξ for each interval in which g′′(ŵtn) is non-negative at the lower end and non-positive at
the upper end. For the latter sequence, g′(ŵtn) = ξ̂, g
′′(wtn) alternates between being non-positive
and non-negative, and g′(wt) ≤ ξ̂ for each interval in which g′′(wtn) is non-positive at the lower end
and non-negative at the upper end. Denote by wtn the element of the sequence corresponding to
the upper end of the interval, in which case the element corresponding to the lower end is wt,n+1.
Using (43) and g′(wtn) = g
′(wt,n+1) = ξ, we find ĝξ(wtn) ≤ 0 and ĝξ(wt,n+1) ≥ 0, where the function











Consider next the function






Since g′(wt) ≥ ξ over the interval [wt,n+1, wtn],
g(wtn)− g(wt,n+1) ≥ ξ (wtn − wt,n+1) ⇒ g(wt,n+1)− ξwt,n+1 ≤ g(wtn)− ξwtn. (IA112)
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Combining (IA111) with (IA112), ĝξ(wtn) ≤ 0 and ĝξ(wt,n+1) ≥ 0, we find ¯̂gξ(wtn) ≤ ¯̂gξ(wt,n+1),




























where the second step follows by dividing by wt,n+1−wtn < 0. The limits of the three terms in the





































wtn = ξ lim
wt→0






where the first limit follows by differentiating R(wt) = A(wt)wt and using limwt→0R
′(wt)wt = 0
(shown in Lemma IA1) and limwt→0A(wt)wt = γ, and the third limit follows from (IA25) and


















which yields a contradiction since ξ̂ > ξ.17 Suppose next, by contradiction, that limwt→0 g
′(wt) =
17The argument establishing that g′(wt) converges to a finite limit when wt goes to zero can be suitably adapted
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∞, in which case g′′(wt) < 0 for small wt. The mean-value theorem implies that there exists








Substituting into (IA108), and using limwt→0 q(wt)
− 1
γ ∈ (0,∞) and g′′(wt) < 0 for small wt, we find
that the left-hand side converges to minus infinity when wt goes to zero. This yields a contradiction
because the right-hand side converges to a finite limit. This completes the proof of the lemma for
γ > K.
Consider next the case γ < K. Since limwt→0 q(wt)
− 1
γ = limwt→0Q(wt) = 0, (IA109) rules out
that g′(wt) converges to a finite limit. Moreover, the same argument as in the case γ > K rules
out that g′(wt) has no limit. Therefore, g
′(wt) ≥ 0 converges to infinity.
Equations (44) and (46) imply that the derivative of the absolute value of expected excess


































] and limwt→0 g′′(wt)wt =
0. Combining with limwt→0A(wt)wt = γ and limwt→0A
′(wt)w
2
t = −γ, we find that the limit of















which is positive under the condition in the proposition. For γ < K, Lemma IA14 shows that
limwt→0 g
′(wt) = ∞, in which case g′′(wt) < 0 for small wt. Equations (IA114) and g′′(wt) < 0















. Since the right-hand side is bounded for wt close to
zero, each of the three negative terms is bounded. Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = γ, the bounded-
ness of the first term means that g′′(wt)wt is bounded. Combining with limwt→∞ g
′(wt) = ∞,
limwt→0A(wt)wt = γ and limwt→0A
′(wt)w
2
t = −γ, we find that the limit of (IA115) when wt goes
to zero is infinity.
III. Proofs of the Results in Sections IV and V of the Main Article
Proof of Proposition 10: We first compute the position Yt of arbitrageurs. Using (42) and (IA94),

















where I is the N × N identity matrix, and the third step follows from (23). Equation (IA116)
implies that Yt is collinear with u. Setting Yt = νu in (IA116), we find
α
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)
= ν + f(wt)νu
⊤Σu ⇒ ν = α





[α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)][1 + u⊤Σuf(wt)]
u =
α
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt) + αu⊤Σug′(wt)
u. (IA117)













Substituting (IA118) and (IA119) into (48), we find (49). Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K},
limwt→0 F
′(wt)wt = limwt→0 g
′(wt)wt = 0 and limwt→0 g(wt) = −αr , (49) implies limwt→0 λnt = ∞.
Since limwt→∞A(wt)wt = γ, limwt→∞ F
′(wt)wt = limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = 0 and limwt→∞ g(wt) = 0,
(49) implies limwt→∞ λnt = 0.
Suppose next that hedgers are short-lived. Since −g(wt) > 0, A(wt) > 0 and g′(wt) ≥ 0,
λnt > 0. To show that λnt is decreasing in wt if γ = 1, we prove the following lemma.
LEMMA IA15 (g′(wt) decreasing if γ = 1): For the solution to (43) constructed in Lemma IA13,
g′(wt) is decreasing if γ = 1.
Proof: If g′(wt) is not decreasing, then there exist m1 < m2 such that g
′(m1) ≤ g′(m2). Consider
first the case where g′(m1) ≥ limwt→0 g′(wt), and recall from Lemma IA14 that limwt→0 g′(wt)
is positive for γ > K and infinity for γ < K. Recall also from the proof of Lemma IA9 that
limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = 0, and hence limwt→∞ g
′(wt) = 0. If g
′(m1) < g
′(m2), then we can choose
ξ > g′(m1) and (m̂2, ˆ̂m2) such that m̂2 < m2 < ˆ̂m2, g
′(m̂2) = g
′( ˆ̂m2) = ξ, g
′′(m̂2) > 0 and
g′′( ˆ̂m2) < 0, and g
′(wt) > ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2). If g′(m1) = g′(m2), then we can choose
ξ ≥ g′(m1) and (m̂2, ˆ̂m2) such that m̂2 < m2 < ˆ̂m2 and the remaining inequalities are weak.



























Lemma IA14 implies that for γ = 1, limwt→0 g
′(wt) =
α2
ρ . Since ξ ≥ g
′(m1) ≥ limwt→0 g′(wt) = α
2
ρ ,
(IA121) implies ¯̂g′ξ(wt) > 0 for all wt ∈ (0,∞). This contradicts ¯̂gξ( ˆ̂m2) ≤ ¯̂gξ(m̂2).
Consider next the case where g′(m1) < limwt→0 g
′(wt). If g
′(m1) < g
′(m2), then we can
choose ξ > g′(m1) and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 2 such that m̂1 < m1 < ˆ̂m1 ≤ m̂2 < m2 < ˆ̂m2,
g′(m̂i) = g
′( ˆ̂mi) = ξ for i = 1, 2, g
′′(m̂1) < 0 and g
′′( ˆ̂m1) > 0, g
′′(m̂2) > 0 and g
′′( ˆ̂m2) < 0,
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g′(wt) < ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂1, ˆ̂m1), and g′(wt) > ξ for all wt ∈ (m̂2, ˆ̂m2). If g′(m1) = g′(m2), then
we can choose ξ > 0 and (m̂i, ˆ̂mi) for i = 1, 2 such that m̂1 < m1 < ˆ̂m1 ≤ m̂2 < m2 < ˆ̂m2 and
the remaining inequalities are weak. Proceeding as in the case g′(m1) ≥ limwt→0 g′(wt), we find
¯̂gξ( ˆ̂m1) ≥ ¯̂gξ(m̂1) and ¯̂gξ( ˆ̂m2) ≤ ¯̂gξ(m̂2). For γ = 1, (IA121) implies that for any ξ > 0, ¯̂g′ξ(wt) is
increasing and becomes positive for large wt. Hence, ¯̂g
′
ξ(wt) is either increasing, or decreasing and
then increasing. Since, ¯̂gξ( ˆ̂m2) ≤ ¯̂gξ(m̂2), ¯̂g′ξ(wt) is decreasing in at least part of (m̂2, ˆ̂m2). Hence,
it is decreasing in all of (m̂1, ˆ̂m1), which contradicts ¯̂gξ( ˆ̂m1) ≥ ¯̂gξ(m̂1).
Since −g(wt) and 1+A(wt)α +u
⊤Σug′(wt) are positive, and −g(wt) is decreasing, λnt is decreasing
if A(wt) + αu
⊤Σug′(wt) is decreasing. The latter function is decreasing for γ = 1 because A(wt) is
decreasing for all γ and Lemma IA15 shows that g′(wt) is decreasing for γ = 1.









Σnn ≡ L(wt)Σnn. (IA122)
Using (IA122) and Ito’s lemma, we find













⊤dRt), dλnt) = L
′(wt)Σnnu
⊤Covt(dwt, dRt). (IA125)
















where the first step follows from (IA94) and the second from (42). The covariance between wealth
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and the return vector dRt is

















where the second step follows from (IA80) and (IA126). Part (i) of the corollary follows by substi-











and is negative when hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic preferences because
L(wt) is decreasing in wt (Proposition 10). Part (ii) of the corollary follows from (IA124). The
proportionality coefficient is positive regardless of the shape of L(wt). Part (iii) of the corollary
follows by substituting (IA127) into (IA125). The proportionality coefficient is negative when
hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic preferences because L(wt) is decreasing
in wt.
Proof of Corollary 4: The proportionality result follows from (44), (IA123), and (IA127). These








This coefficient is negative when hedgers are short-lived and arbitrageurs have logarithmic prefer-
ences because L(wt) is decreasing in wt.
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We denote the numerator and denominator of the fraction in the first line of (IA130) by NC(wt)
and DC(wt), respectively. We denote the numerator and denominator of the fraction in the first
line of (IA131) by NΠ(wt) and DΠ(wt), respectively, noting that NC(wt) = DΠ(wt).
Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K} and limwt→0 F ′(wt)wt = 0, limwt→0DC(wt)wt = max{γ,K}.
Since, in addition, limwt→0 g(wt) = −αr , limwt→0 g
′(wt)wt = limwt→0 g
′′(wt)w
2







t = −max{γ,K}, limwt→0NC(wt)w2t = −
max{γ,K}
r . Hence limwt→0NC(wt)wt =
−∞. Since, in addition, limwt→0 f(wt) = 0, (IA130) implies that limwt→0CΛ(wt) = −∞.
Since limwt→0A(wt)wt = max{γ,K}, limwt→0NΠ(wt)wt = max{γ,K}. Since, in addition,
DΠ(wt) = NC(wt), limwt→0DΠ(wt)wt = −∞. Therefore, (IA131) implies that limwt→0ΠΛ(wt) = 0.
Since limwt→∞A(wt) = limwt→∞ F
′(wt) = 0 (because the limits of these functions multiplied
by wt are γ and zero, respectively), limwt→∞DC(wt) = α. Since, in addition, limwt→∞ g(wt) =
limwt→∞ g
′′(wt) = 0 and limwt→∞A
′(wt) = limwt→∞ F
′′(wt) = limwt→∞ g
′(wt) = 0 (because the
limits of the first two functions multiplied by w2t are −γ and zero, respectively, and the limit of the
third function multiplied by wt is zero), limwt→∞NC(wt) = 0. Since, in addition, limwt→∞ f(wt) =
0, (IA130) implies that limwt→∞C
Λ(wt) = 0.
We finally determine limwt→∞Π
Λ(wt) when hedgers are short-lived. Since limwt→∞A(wt)wt =
γ, limwt→∞NΠ(wt)wt = γ. We next derive limwt→∞DΠ(wt)wt assuming that g
′′(wt)w
2
t has a (fi-
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Since limwt→∞A(wt) = limwt→∞A
′(wt)wt = limwt→∞ g(wt) = limwt→∞ g
′(wt)wt = limwt→∞ g
′(wt) =
limwt→∞ g
′′(wt)wt = 0, limwt→∞DΠ(wt)wt = 0. Therefore, (IA131) implies that limwt→∞Π
Λ(wt)
is plus or minus infinity. To show that the limit is −∞, we note that the largest-order term
in −g′(wt)
(




is −g′(wt), which is non-positive because g(wt) is increasing,









α , which is negative
because g(wt) < 0 and A
′(wt) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 12: We first derive the positions of hedgers and arbitrageurs, as well as asset
prices, in an equilibrium with positive supply. We next derive the Bellman equations of hedgers
and arbitrageurs. We finally show the equivalence with a zero-supply equilibrium.
Positive supply does not change the asset demands (11) and (18) of hedgers and arbitrageurs.
We write these demands in terms of the long-maturity assets, using the mapping derived in Lemma
1. (That is, we use (39) to replace D̄ − πt by µSt + D̄ − rSt, and (40) and (41) to replace (xt, yt)






(µSt + D̄ − rSt)
α









(µSt + D̄ − rSt)
A(wt)
, (IA133)
respectively. Using the market-clearing equation
Xt + Yt = s, (IA134)






(µSt + D̄ − rSt)− α(σSt + σ)−1σu− F ′(wt)s
α− F ′(wt)
. (IA135)
Substituting Xt and Yt from (IA135) and (IA133), respectively, into (IA134), we find that expected
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excess returns are






bt ≡ (σSt + σ)s+ σu. (IA137)






Substituting ct from (IA14), µSt+ D̄− rSt from (IA136), and Yt from (IA138) into (IA92), we find






































































2 [α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αS′(wt)⊤s]2
S′′(wt) + D̄ − rS(wt)
=
αA(wt)
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αS′(wt)⊤s
Σ(s+ u), (IA144)
where the second step follows from (IA143). The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 7
implies that S(wt) must have the form in (42). Substituting (42) into (IA144), we find that g(wt)
solves the ODE
α2(s+ u)⊤Σ(s+ u)










α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs
. (IA145)






Substituting bt from (IA146) into (IA136) and (IA138), we can write µSt + D̄ − rSt and Yt as
µSt + D̄ − rSt =
αA(wt)





α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs
(σSt + σ)
−1σ(s+ u), (IA148)
respectively. This completes the derivation of positions and prices: the position Yt of arbitrageurs
is given by (IA148), the position Xt of hedgers is given by s − Yt, and asset prices are given by
(42), where g(wt) solves the ODE (IA145).
We next derive the Bellman equation of arbitrageurs. To do that, we write (IA12) in terms
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of the long-maturity assets, using (39) to replace D̄ − πt by µSt + D̄ − rSt, and (40) and (41) to
replace (xt, yt) by (Xt, Yt). We also note that the maximum in (IA12) is achieved for ĉt given by
(16) and for ŷt = yt
ŵt
wt
, and we substitute ct from (IA14), µSt + D̄− rSt from (IA147), and Yt from




























[α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs]2
.
(IA149)



















We next derive the Bellman equation of hedgers. Using (39) to replace D̄−πt by µSt+ D̄−rSt,
and (40) and (41) to replace (xt, yt) by (Xt, Yt), we find the following counterpart of (IA21):





X⊤t (σSt + σ)
⊤ − u⊤σ⊤
]
[(σSt + σ)Xt + uσ]
− F ′(wt)
[





F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]
Y ⊤t (σSt + σ)
⊤(σSt + σ)Yt + αF
′(wt)u
⊤σ⊤(σSt + σ)Yt





bt − (σSt + σ)Yt − 2u⊤σ⊤
]
[bt − (σSt + σ)Yt]
− F ′(wt)
[





F ′′(wt)− F ′(wt)2
]
Y ⊤t (σSt + σ)
⊤(σSt + σ)Yt + αF
′(wt)u
⊤σ⊤(σSt + σ)Yt, (IA152)
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where the second step follows from (IA134) and (IA137). Using (IA138), we find




[A(wt)− F ′(wt)]σ(s+ u)
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs
, (IA153)
where the second step follows from (IA146). Substituting ct from (IA14), µSt + D̄ − rSt from
(IA147), Yt from (IA148), and bt − (σSt + σ)Yt from (IA153), we can write (IA152) as













[α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs]2
+
α2u⊤Σ(s+ u)A(wt)
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs
.
(IA154)
The equilibrium is characterized by the ODEs (19), (IA145), (IA150) and (IA154). To show
the equivalence with a zero-supply equilibrium, we define the function
F̂ (wt) ≡ F (wt)− αg(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs. (IA155)




















respectively. We next multiply (IA145) by α(s+ u)⊤Σs and add it to (IA154). Using (IA155), we
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can write the resulting equation as













[α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs]2
+
α2(s+ u)⊤Σ(s+ u)A(wt)
α+A(wt)− F ′(wt)− αg′(wt)(s+ u)⊤Σs
⇔ 1 = rF̂ (wt)− r log(r)− αu


















Equations (IA156), (IA157) and (IA158) are identical to (43), (26) and (27), respectively, except
that F (wt) is replaced by F̂ (wt) and u is replaced by s+u. Hence, a solution (q(wt), A(wt), F̂ (wt), g(wt))
to the system of (19), (IA156), (IA157) and (IA158), coincides with a solution (q(wt), A(wt), F (wt), g(wt))
to the system of (19), (26), (27) and (43) provided that we replace u by s+ u in the latter system.
Since the function g(wt) is identical in the two cases, the price is the same in the positive-supply
equilibrium and in a zero-supply equilibrium in which u is replaced by s + u. The position Yt of
arbitrageurs is also the same across the two equilibria because of (IA148) and F̂ (wt) = F (wt). Since
Yt is the same, the market-clearing equation (20) implies that the position Xt of hedgers in the
zero-supply equilibrium is equal to that in the positive-supply equilibrium minus s. Since positions
and prices are the same across the two equilibria, the exposures of hedgers and arbitrageurs to the
Brownian shocks are also the same.
Proof of Proposition 13: The arguments in the proof of Proposition 12 that concern prices, positions
and the arbitrageurs’ Bellman equation remain valid for short-lived hedgers, provided that we set
F (wt) = 0. Hence, S(wt) has the form in (42) and g(wt) solves the ODE
α2(s+ u)⊤Σ(s+ u)












which is obtained from (IA145) by setting F (wt) = 0. Substituting µSt from (IA141) into (34), and
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using (42), (IA145), (IA146) and F (wt) = 0, we can write expected excess returns as (44).
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